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Archeological Resource Preservation: The Role of 
State and Local Government 
Ronald H. Rosenberg* 
Americans have begun to rediscover their cultural history. In 
an effort to define a national identity and chart a future course, 
the nation is looking to its past. In many parts of the country, 
there is evidence that individuals and governments are becoming 
aware of the value of preserving cultural resources. That move-
ment has been reflected primarily in the upsurge of interest in pre-
serving buildings or districts of historical value.1 Historical preser-
vation has also become a technique for redevelopment of many 
declining urban districts throughout the nation.2 While there may 
be various reasons for the increased enthusiasm for historical pres-
ervation within the urban context, it is apparent that society has 
recognized that certain places and structures are imbued with a 
cultural value connecting the present with the past. That recogni-
tion illustrates a social awareness of the benefit in protecting cul-
turally important sites and objects. 3 
Historically or architecturally significant buildings, however, 
are only one familiar example of a cultural resource. More broadly 
defined as "physical features, both natural and man-made, associ-
ated with human activity [and] possessing significance . . . in his-
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law, Williamsburg, Virginia. 
1. Judicial support for historical preservation can be seen in cases such as Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), where the United States Supreme 
Court approved local government efforts to preserve historically significant buildings. In 
Penn Central, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York City Landmark Pres-
ervation Law against a claim made by the owners of the Grand Central Station that the city 
law effected an unconstitutional "taking" of their property for public use. I d. at 122, 138. A 
secondary issue, not addressed in the majority opinion, was whether the transfer of develop-
ment rights could be "just compensation" in the event an unconstitutional "taking" was 
found. See id. at 150-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
2. See generally ADVISORY CouNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE CoNTRIBUTION OF 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION TO URBAN REVITALIZATION (1979). 
3. In Penn Central, the United States Supreme Court recognized that landmark pres-
ervation ordinances were "expected to produce a widespread public benefit" and further 
noted that the destruction of an historical landmark like Grand Central Station could be 
harmful to society. Arguments to the contrary ignored "the development in sensibilities and 
ideals reflected in landmark legislation like New York City's." 438 U.S. at 133 n.30. 
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tory, architecture, archeology, or human development,"" the term 
"cultural resources" also encompasses archeological resources, that 
is, physical sites of prior human habitation and material objects or 
artifacts associated with the sites. G Archeological resources fre-
quently provide the only material link with past civilizations that 
left no written record of their existence. In addition, they provide 
insights into and information about past civilizations that are nec-
essary for solving modern-day problems. Recognizing the intangi-
ble and irreplaceable value of archeological resources, American so-
ciety has sought to identify and protect them through varied 
legislative and administrative actions for nearly 100 years.6 
Today, archeological resources7 are vulnerable to damage or 
obliteration by a number of forces; some of those forces are subject 
to governmental control, and some are not. Archeological sites and 
artifacts can be easily damaged by public or private land develop-
ment or construction. A number of statutory provisions require 
that advance planning include consideration of the effect federal 
4. Fowler, Protection of the Cultural Environment in Federal Law, in FEDERAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW, 1467-68 (1974). 
5. From the perspective of the archeologist, physical sites and artifacts are interrelated 
sources of information about prior human experiences. The location of an artifact at the 
archeological site can be of major importance in understanding earlier social patterns. To 
preserve that unique cultural data, archeological resources must be viewed as an integrated 
whole. 
6. In 1889, Congress appropriated funds to protect and repair the Casa Grande ruin in 
Arizona and to permit the President to reserve the land from settlement and sale. See Act 
of March 2, 1889, ch. 411, 25 Stat. 939, 961. That provision alloted only two thousand dol-
lars for the project, a relatively insignificant portion of the Interior Department's appropria-
tion. In 1892, President Benjamin Harrison formally reserved the ruin and 480 acres around 
it. See Proclamation of Dec. 10, 1909, 36 Stat. 2504. However, the legal description of the 
protected federal land was erroneous, and President William H. Taft had to correct it by 
presidential proclamation in 1909. See id. President Woodrow Wilson officially establi11hed 
the Casa Grande ruin as a national monument under the authority of the Antiquities Act. 
See Proclamation of Aug. 3, 1918, 40 Stat. 1818. Federal involvement in the protection of 
archeological resources has continued from that early time. See Historic Sites, Buildings arid 
Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976); Archeological and Historic Preservation Act, 
id. §§ 469-469c; Reservoir Salvage Act, id.j Archeological Resources Protection Act, id. §§ 
470aa-47011 (Supp. III 1979); National Environmental Policy Act, id. § 470f (1976); Depart-
ment of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976); Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 
8921, reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 app., at 429 (1976) (calling for cooperation of federal and 
state agencies in identifying and preserving historical and cultural structures and sites); Ad-
visory Council on Historic Preservation Procedures, 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-.15 (1980); Council 
on Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1.6 (1981) (implementing the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act). 
7. The recently enacted Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) provides a 
statutory definition of archeological resources that focuses primarily on artifacts or material 
remains rather than the site itself. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1976). 
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activities will have on those cultural resources.8 Those specialized 
review statutes have done much to make federal agencies aware of 
the need to plan projects and programs in a way that minimizes 
adverse effects on archeological resources. In addition, they have 
provided a reviewable legal standard for agency performance. Sim-
ilar state and local requirements have also been imposed to regu-
late potentially destructive activities on nonfederal lands. 9 Thus, 
the legal system has been structured to protect archeological re-
sources from damaging governmental acts in much the same fash-
ion as it has protected environmental interests. 
Because many archeological resources are considered highly 
valuable art objects, there is an additional threat to their existence 
and to the physical integrity of the site from which they are taken. 
With the value of artifacts on the domestic and international art 
markets rapidly escalating, commercially motivated looters have 
stepped up their destructive activities on both public and private 
lands. 10 In addition, private collectors have enhanced their collec-
tions at the expense of the general public by illegally taking arti-
facts from public lands. Vandals, as always, have done their dam-
age through senseless and wanton destruction. That looting and 
vandalism has resulted not only in the loss of valuable objects, 11 
8. See authorities cited note 6 supra. 
9. See notes 115-125 infra and accompanying text. 
10. For example, artifacts taken by looters from a site in the Gila National Forest in 
southwestern New Mexico were valued at $4000. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 943 
(lOth Cir. 1979). See Hearings on S. 490, Archeological Resources Protection Act, Before 
the Subcomm. on Parks, Recreation and Renewable Resources of the Senate Comm. on 
Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate 
Hearings] (statement of Professor Raymond H. Thompson that a single pot could command 
a price between $10,000 and $30,000). In a recent case, three men pled guilty to charges that 
they had violated the ARPA by stealing $6,000 to $8,000 worth of clay pots, bone awls, 
human skeletal remains and other artifacts from prehistoric Indian ruins in the Tonto Na-
tional Forest in Arizona. See N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 6, cols. 4-5 (city ed.). 
11. Because valuable artifacts are usually buried under the surface of the land, tradi-
tional property law has regarded them as belonging to the owner of the locus in quo. See R. 
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 26 (3d ed. 1975). See also Goddard v. Winchell, 86 Iowa 71, 52 
N.W. 1124 (1892); Alfred v. Biegel, 240 Mo. App. 818, 219 S.W.2d 665 (1949). That has been 
the position consistently taken by Congress and federal land management agencies where 
discoveries have been made on federal land. As the owner of the locus in quo and as the 
sovereign, the federal government has claimed comprehensive rights to property under its 
control. In California v. Mead, 618 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit held that a 
large meteorite discovered on federal land in the Old Woman Mountain Range in California 
could be removed and studied by the Smithsonian Institution under a permit issued by the 
Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Antiquities Act of 1906. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). 
The court added: "[W]e interpret the Act and its legislative history to give the Secretary of 
Interior broad discretionary power to dispose of objects of antiquity found on federal land 
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but in the destruction of scientific information about prior socie-
ties. Although governments may directly control their own actions 
or those of regulated private interests, 12 they can only deter private 
individuals' illicit activities indirectly through the vigorous use of 
civil or criminal sanctions. Furthermore, no matter how effective 
federal or state policy is in regulating the actions of the govern-
ment itself, those efforts are of little value if commercially moti-
vated abuses on private land remain unchecked. When an archeo-
logical resource is lost, whether through private taking, public theft 
or accidental damage, unique and truly irreplaceable data is lost 
forever. 
This article will examine ways in which the American legal 
system has responded to accommodate cultural resources as a pro-
tected value. First, the development of federal cultural resource 
policy will be briefly traced to determine its scope and effective-
ness. Special attention will be given to the potential use of federal 
policy as a model for state action. Second, the numerous state law 
techniques for preserving archeological resources will be described 
and evaluated, and the wide variety of statutory approaches and 
different perceptions of the state's role in protecting cultural re-
sources will be demonstrated. The relationship of federal policy de-
velopment to that of the states also will be examined. Finally, a 
series of recommendations for the enhancement of existing state 
laws will be provided. Those suggestions will reflect the important 
role of state government in preserving the nation's cultural history. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CULTURAL RESOURCE POLICY 
During the nineteenth century, the federal government had a 
limited, but significant, involvement in cultural resource protec-
tion. Beginning in 1872 with the establishment of Yellowstone Na-
tional Park, u the federal government began to remove areas of 
unique scenic, scientific and historical value from settlement, sale 
or occupancy.14 By those reservations of land, the federal govern-
under his jurisdiction." 618 F.2d at 621. 
Some states have also claimed title to archeological discoveries made on state and local 
government lands. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-80-401 (1974). 
12. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976). 
13. See id. § 21. 
14. Congress viewed the removal of particular parcels of public land as an effective, 
low-cost method of preserving archeologically significant, or otherwise important, properties. 
The inclusion of virtually unlimited presidential power to reserve federal lands for "national 
monuments" in the 1906 Antiquities Act, see id. § 431 (originally enacted as Act of June 8, 
1906, ch. 3060, § 2, 34 Stat. 225), reflected a major shift of responsibility to the executive 
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ment preserved spectacular natural wonders and established the 
legitimacy of withdrawing lands from the public domain as a 
means of protecting them. In 1892, the reservation mechanism was 
first used to protect an archeologically significant site-the Casa 
Grande Indian ruins in Arizona-from damage caused by looters 
and vandals.111 Despite early recognition of the reservation tech-
nique, however, it was only available to preserve a limited number 
of nationally significant sites because reservation of public land re-
quired express congressional action in each instance. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, federal policy-
makers became more active in archeological preservation by en-
couraging the acquisition of historically important private land. 
During a period of nine years, the federal government acquired five 
significant Civil War battlefields for preservation as military 
parks.16 Those parks were considered important to the nation be-
cause they were "fields of some of the most remarkable maneuvers 
and most brilliant fighting in the War of Rebellion."~7 The estab-
lishment of military parlf~ as Civil War memorials marked the fed-
eral government's initial involvement in the acquisition, manage-
ment and protection of places having national historical value. 
During the same period, judicial precedents were established 
that validated governmental preservation of historical properties. 
For example, in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway, 18 
the United States Supreme Court determined that the exercise of 
eminent domain powers in acquiring the Gettysburg battlefield 
constituted a taking of private property for a valid public purpose. 
Justice Peckham found that condemning private land for a nation-
ally important commemorative park inculcated patriotism in the 
public, a purpose in which "there can be no well founded doubt."~8 
branch for cultural resource protection. It also emphasized the early idea that direct govern-
mental ownership was the most effective preservation technique. The state/federal friction 
inherent in the exercise of that power was well illustrated in Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 
1155 (D. Alaska 1978), where the State of Alaska challenged a presidential declaration set-
ting aside a large number of acres in the state as a national monument. Id. at 1159-60. 
A number of states have also provided for the reservation of archeologically significant 
state lands from sale. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-805 (1976); note 177 infra. 
15. See note 6 supra. 
16. From 1890 to 1899, the federal government established the Civil War battlefields 
of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Shiloh, Gettysburg and Vicksburg as national military parks. 
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 424, 430f, 430g, 430h (1976). 
17. Id. § 424. 
18. 160 u.s. 668 (1896). 
19. Id. at 680. In 1929, the Court, relying on Gettysburg Electric Railway, upheld a 
Kansas statute permitting the use of state condemnation authority to acquire any tract or 
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Thus, Gettysburg Electric Railway established the principle that 
the acquisition and protection of places having significant histori-
cal value was a proper governmental function. 
As the nineteenth century ended, federal cultural resource pol-
icy was limited to actual governmental ownership and control of a 
small number of military and archeological monuments. However, 
during the last quarter of that century, scientific organizations 
were active in focusing the attention of the federal government and 
the general public on the deteriorating condition of archeological 
resources.20 Privately funded expeditions to the southwest United 
States ascertained that the Indian ruins in that region had been 
seriously damaged by looters and vandals. 21 The reports reaching 
the East indicated such severe damage that prominent archeolo-
gists and their sponsors petitioned both Congress and the Depart-
ment of the Interior as early as 1882 for assistance in protecting 
the imperiled sites by preserving the artifacts and reserving the 
sites from public sale. Unfortunately, public support was not yet 
strong enough to force protective legislation.22 Even at that early 
stage, the conflicting goals of conservationists and developers were 
readily apparent.23 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years 
parcel of land in the State of Kansas that possessed unusual historical interest. Roe v. 
Smith, 278 U.S. 191 (1929). In accordance with the Supreme Court's approval of acquiring 
culturally significant property through eminent domain, several states have specifically em-
powered state agencies and local governments to condemn cultural properties. See HAWAII 
REv. STAT. § 6E-3(2) (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.09 (West 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 82-
120 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-25.53 (West 1967). However, some states have prohib-
ited local governments from using eminent domain powers to acquire cultural properties. 
See Miss. ConE ANN. § 39-13-9 (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 253.403 (Vernon Supp. 
1981). 
20. See R.F. LEE, THE ANTIQUITIES Acr! OF 1906 1-12 (1970). 
21. See id., at 14-18. 
22. Senator Hoar of Massachusetts presented a petition from the New England His-
toric Genealogical Society requesting Congress to withhold lands in the Southwest from 
public sale. Although the petition formally brought the question of antiquities protection 
before Congress, it did not arouse sufficient interest to save the matter from an anonymous 
death in the Senate Committee on Public Lands. See 13 CoNG. REc. 3777 (1882). 
23. In the present context, that conflict is dramatically apparent in the effort to re-
strict unlimited presidential power, derived from the Antiquities Act, to declare national 
monuments, thereby removing them from development and use. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). 
Alaska's Senator Gravel, concerned about the creation of 17 national monuments in Alaska, 
which would have precluded oil and gas exploration on 56 million acres, sponsored a bill 
that would have amended the Antiquities Act by limiting executive withdrawals to 5,000 
acres without prior congressional approval. See 125 CoNG. REc. S10837 (daily ed. July 30, 
1979). See also 15 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Docs. 121, 151 (Jan. 25, 1979) (President Carter's 
State of the Union message outlining presidential action in preserving Alaskan wilderness 
areas). 
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of the twentieth century, public awareness of American archeology 
was greatly enhanced by museum displays and other exhibitions of 
artifacts. However, that rising awareness also brought increased 
looting and consequent site damage. It became clear that federal 
action was required if the nation's cultural resources were to be 
preserved. 
Although legislation was introduced as early as 1900 directing 
the President to reserve selected archeological sites and prohibit-
ing the unauthorized disturbance of archeological resources, lack of 
national awareness and concern delayed congressional action. Dur-
ing that period of legislative inaction, federal land managers, rely-
ing on administrative authority, withdrew lands under their con-
trol from public sale, settlement or entry,24 which temporarily 
protected identified sites until more formal action could be taken. 
After six years of deliberation, Congress attempted to regulate 
the looting and unauthorized exploitation of significant Indian ar-
tifacts and structures by passing the Antiquities Act of 1906.211 The 
1906 Act specifically prohibited the appropriation, excavation, in-
jury or destruction of any "historic or prehistoric ruin or monu-
ment or any object of antiquity located on federal land" without 
first obtaining permission from the federal land manager6 andes-
tablished criminal penalties of up to $500 in fines or ninety days 
imprisonment or both.27 Congress anticipated the need for expert 
examination and possible excavation of archeological sites and al-
lowed "properly qualified" institutions to undertake the task pur-
suant to a federal permit.28 Additionally, the 1906 legislation gave 
24. See Lee, supra note 20, at 47-77. 
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976) (original version at ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906)). The 
Antiquities Act was the only federal law prior to enactment of the 1979 Archeological Re-
sources Protection Act, id. §§470aa-470ll (Supp. ill 1979), to preserve archeological sites 
and artifacts on federal lands from the destructive actions of private individuals. 
26. Id. § 433 (1976). Unfortunately, the terms "historic or prehistoric ruin or monu-
ment" and "object of antiquity" were not defined in the statute, which eventually resulted 
in the invalidation of the statute as unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Diaz, 499 
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974) (term "objects of antiquity" is unconstitutionally vague if the An-
tiquities Act prohibition included artifacts only three or four years old). But see United 
States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979) (term "objects of antiquities" not unconstitu-
tionally vague as applied to Mimbres bowls 800-900 years old and like objects). 
27. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976). Under the 1979 Archeological Resources Protection Act, 
the criminal sanctions were significantly increased and combined with civil penalties. See id. 
§§ 470ee-470ff (Supp. ill 1979). 
28. Id. § 432 (1976). The administrative regulations issued under the 1906 Act state 
that permits "will be granted . . • to reputable museums, universities, colleges or other rec-
ognized scientific or educational institutions, or to their duly authorized agents." 43 C.F.R. § 
3.3 (1980). 
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the President broad discretionary power to create national monu-
ments by reserving qualified lands in the public domain.29 
Although historically important, the 1906 Antiquities Act 
proved inadequate. The statute sought only to regulate cultural re-
sources located on federal land and did not attempt to extend fed-
eral regulatory power to property held by states or individuals. 
The drafters of the Antiquities Act seemed to approach the prob-
lem of archeological plunder as a question of federal land manage-
ment rather than cultural protection. By design, the system relied 
on the issuance of permits and the close supervision of federal offi-
cials to ensure that unauthorized excavation would not occur. The 
vast expanse of territory under federal control, the limited number 
of federal officials and the relative unimportance of administering 
the Antiquities Act combined to reduce the effectiveness of the 
statute. Finally, as time passed, it became apparent that the penal-
ties provided in the Act, coupled with its lax enforcement, 30 did 
not deter potential violators. The weakness of the 1906 Act and the 
increased market value of artifacts made the enactment of stronger 
legislation inevitable. 
Although no federal legislation for the protection of archeo-
logical sites and objects would be forthcoming for nearly thirty 
years, several significant events occurred during that period which 
influenced the course of cultural resource preservation. In the late 
1920's, with the substantial financial support of John D. Rockefel-
ler, Jr., the town of Williamsburg, Virginia, was restored to its pre-
Revolutionary War condition.31 That project resulted in the devel-
opment of improved archeological field methods and drew public 
attention to the careful restoration techniques employed.32 In the 
1930's, the economic depression bolstered the federal government's 
role in surveying and salvaging historically and archeologically sig-
nificant properties. The Historic American Building Survey, which 
29. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). That power has been frequently exercised and has led to 
serious discord between at least one state and the federal government. See notes 14, 23 
supra. . 
30. That ineffective enforcement was described well by Judge Merrill, in United States 
v. Diaz, 449 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974): "Counsel on neither side was able to cite an instance 
prior to this in which conviction under the [1906) statute was sought by the United States." 
Id. at 114. 
31. The restoration of that magnificant colonial city was largely attributable to the 
initiative of Dr. W.A.R. Goodwin and the financial support of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. For a 
textual and pictorial description of the restoration, see The Restoration of Colonial Wil-
liamsburg in Virginia, 78 THE ARE:HITECTURAL REcORD 356 (1935). 
32. See T. KING, P. HICKMAN & G. BERG, ANTHROPOLOGY IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 21 
(1977). 
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preserved data concerning historical structures,33 provided employ-
ment for a large number of architects. Under the supervision of the 
Smithsonian Institution, the Works Progress Administration 
(WP A) hired a large number of unemployed persons to examine 
and excavate archeological sites primarily located in the area af-
fected by the newly created Tennessee Valley Authority. 
When Congress enacted the Historic Sites Act in 1935,34 fed-
eral cultural resource policy expanded broadly from the initial po-
sition taken by the Antiquities Act. The new statute declared that 
it was the "national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, 
buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration 
and benefit of the people of the United States."35 The statute con-
tinued the preexisting policy of focusing on sites having national, 
rather than local or regional, significance. The concept of public 
use of historical properties, which may have reflected Congress' in-
terest in establishing public museums, was also maintained in the 
law. However, by emphasizing the preservation of historical and 
prehistoric sites, the Act apparently rejected the salvage approach 
embraced by the federally sponsored WP A program. 
The 1935 Act accorded the National Park Service central au-
thority to carry out the federal government's program of historical 
and archeological preservation.36 Specifically, the National Park 
Service was directed to gather documentary information on histori-
cal and archeological resources through survey and examination of 
those sites, 37 thereby involving the federal government in a contin-
uing process of identifying and evaluating cultural resources 
throughout the nation. 
The 1935 Act embraced the idea of public ownership of sites 
as a major mechanism for the protection of historical and archeo-
logical resource areas. To achieve that purpose, the agency was 
33. See Fowler, supra note 4, at 1479 & n.44. 
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 {1976) {original version at ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 {1935)). 
35. Id. § 461. 
36. Id. §§ 462, 464. In 1916, the National Park Service was established as a separate 
entity within the Department of Interior: 
[The National Park Service] shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas 
known as national parks, monuments, and reservations .•. by such means and mea-
sures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and res-
ervations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic ob-
jects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such 
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations. 
Id. § 1. 
37. Id. §§ 462{a)-{c). 
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permitted to acquire "by gift, purchase, or otherwise" both real 
and personal property and to restore significant properties for the 
public's benefit.38 The statute also encouraged the development of 
historical or archeological sites as public museums, possibly in re-
sponse to the Williamsburg restoration project.39 As a result, fifty-
six historical sites have been established under the authority of the 
1935 statute.40 Although the actual accomplishments of the 1935 
Act may have been modest, it did serve to reinforce federal in-
volvement in cultural resource protection and placed the primary 
responsibility for federal historical preservation in the Department 
of the Interior. 
There was little legislative activity in the area of cultural re-
source protection in the years immediately following World War 
Il.41 However, federal development of public resources rapidly ex-
panded in number and scope, often affecting areas of archeological 
significance.42 In response to those impacts, federal agencies fre-
38. Id. §§ 462(d), (f); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 680-83 
(1896), apparently permitted federal condemnation for the purpose of historical preserva-
tion. See text accompanying note 18 supra. In Barnidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th 
Cir. 1939), the c.ourt held that the Secr.etary of Interior could condemn private property 
under the authority of the Historic Sites Act, provided that compensation was ultimately 
paid to the private owner. The Eighth Circuit found that the "or otherwise" language in the 
1935 act permitted condemnation under the general federal eminent domain authority. Id. 
at 297-98. The only question remaining was whether the Interior Department's purpose in 
acquiring the old St. Louis, Missouri site constituted a public use. The court concluded: 
"[W]e think there can be no reasonable doubt that the proposed use of this land is a public 
one." Id. at 299. 
39. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. 
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
41. In 1949, Congress did enact legislation creating the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation in the United States. See id. §§ 468(a)-(d) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of 
Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 755, § 1, 63 Stat. 927). The Trust, established as a "charitable, educa-
tional, and nonprofit corporation," was expected to acquire, through a variety of means, 
"sites, buildings and objects significant in American history or culture" and to undertake a 
preservation program. Id. § 468c(f). Modeled in part after the British National Trust, the 
American organization was intended to supplement federal preservation efforts and to serve 
as the recipient of private contributions, which otherwise probably would not be made to 
the federal government. See Letter from J.A. Krug, Secretary of Interior, to Congressman J. 
Hardin Peterson, Chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, reprinted in [1949] 
U.S. ConE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2285, 2287-88. 
42. The legislative history of the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960 reflects the accelera-
tion of federal water development activities that had damaging effects on archeological re-
sources. In a letter supporting the enactment of protective legislation, Assistant Secretary of 
the Interior Fred G. Aandahl stated: 
With the increased industrialization and greater Federal activity in construction 
of large-scale multipurpose water control projects, the problem of salvaging and pre-
serving archeological and historical antiquities of national significance in advance of 
destruction becomes ever more critical. The bill emphasizes the point that the neces-
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quently undertook archeological salvage as part of their opera-
tions.-'3 That trend was reflected in federal highway legislation"" 
and, most notably, in the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960.45 
The Reservoir Salvage Act provided for a system of inter-
agency notification and funding of salvage activities in the face of 
federal dam construction that might "cause irreparable loss or de-
struction of significant scientific, prehistorical, historical, or arche-
ological data. "46 The intent of the statute was to ensure that arche-
ological investigation and salvage operations would begin at the 
planning stage of a federally owned or federally licensed dam. 47 An 
important feature of the Act was the creation of a consultation 
procedure between the project agency and the Department of the 
Interior concerning the cultural resource impact of a proposed 
dam. The Interior Department was authorized to survey project lo-
cations for significant archeological data and to recover and pre-
serve that which was discovered.-'8 Those procedures further rein-
sary archeological and historical salvage should be performed in advance of such con-
struction activities, and it reflects a growing public awareness of their increasing loss 
of this national heritage through such Federal and private activities. 
H.R. REP. No. 1392, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 2403, 2405. See also S. REP. No. 1110, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1949] 
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2285-86 (report on legislation creating the National Trust for 
Historic Preservation). The effects of increased urbanization occurring during the 1950's and 
1960's resulted in the establishment of a federal environmental policy that addressed cul-
tural resource protection. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1976). 
43. The House Committee Report on the 1960 Reservoir Salvage Act indicated that at 
least one federal agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, had cooperated with archeological 
salvage activities on its projects under authority of the 1935 Historic Sites Act, and that the 
Army believed the 1960 legislation was unnecessary. See H.R. REP. No. 1392, supra note 42, 
at 3-4, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2405-06. 
44. See 23 U.S.C. § 305 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 27, 1958, PUB. L. No. 
85-767, 72 Stat. 913). As part of a highway project, that statute made federal funding availa-
ble for survey and salvage work for archeological and paleontological objects "having Na-
tional, State, or local historical or scientific significance." 23 C.F.R. § 765 (1980). The statute 
reflected a legislative attitude favoring a funding system over avoidance of such sites in 
project planning. 
45. 16 U.S.C. § 469 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 27, 1960, PUB. L. No. 86-
523, 74 Stat. 220). 
46. !d. § 469a-1. 
47. A Committee Report indicated that the purpose of the statute was "to place this 
salvage program, so far as it relates to the construction of dams, on a firmer basis by estab-
lishing definite procedures for coordination of archeological investigations and salvage oper-
ations with the planning and construction of dams by Federal agencies or under permits 
granted by Federal agencies." H.R. REP. No. 1392, supra note 42, at 1, reprinted in [1960] 
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2403-04. The drafters believed that the statute would make 
agency responsibilities mandatory where they had previously been considered discretionary. 
Id. at 2, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 2404. 
48. In addition, the 1960 Act specifically allowed up to one percent of the funds appro-
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forced the Interior Department's role as the expert agency in 
cultural resource protection. The potential scope of the survey and 
salvage program was broadened in 197 4 by the enactment of the 
Archeological and Historical Preservation Act (AHPA),"9 which ex-
tended the prior law to encompass "any alteration of the terrain 
caused as a result of any Federal construction project or federally 
licensed activity or program."150 
The primary purpose of the federal program authorized by the 
Reservoir Salvage Act and the AHPA was the preservation of data 
by investigation and salvage techniques rather than by requiring 
agency project planning that was sensitive to cultural resource pro-
tection and that avoided the use of historically and archeologically 
significant lands.151 The program was intended to lessen the de-
priated for most dam construction projects to be used for archeological resource investiga-
tion and salvage. See 16 U.S.C. § 469c(a) (1976). The Act authorized separate funding for 
the Interior Department's activities. See id. §§ 469c(b)-(c). 
49. I d. §§ 469-469c (1976 & Supp. ill 1979) (originally enacted as Act of May 24, 1974, 
PUB. L. No. 93-291, 88 Stat. 174). 
50. !d. § 469 (1976). The scope of the revised statute was intended to be quite broad. 
In its section-by-section analysis of the Act, the House Interior and Insular Affairs Commit-
tee stated: 
[T]his legislation broadens that policy [to preserve and recover historical or archeo-
logical data] to include any Federal or federally assisted construction projects involv-
ing the alteration of the terrain, as well as other Federally licensed projects, or Fed-
eral activities or programs which disrupt such values. 
H.R. REP. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & An. NEWS 
3168, 3172. The Committee's report made it clear that the review process would be triggered 
not only by construction projects but by an agency awareness that its "program or federally 
assisted construction project or activity will cause the loss of scientific, prehistorical, histori-
cal, archeological or paleontological data." Id. Apparently, that broad interpretation of 
agency obligations under the 1974 Act has not been judicially affirmed. 
51. However, the House Committee Report on the 1974 Act contained language indi-
cating a recognition that site preservation was preferable to excavation and salvage. The 
Committee noted: 
Much of the loss of these nonrenewable resources can be avoided by proper ad-
vance planning and survey work. Sometimes, where a significant area is known to 
exist, projects could be relocated without substantially interfering with the end result. 
Preservation of archeological, paleontological, and other historic and scientific sites 
is nearly always considered preferable to their excavation unless the data is consid-
ered critical to current studies. In some cases, however, there are no alternatives to 
the destruction of the site. In such situations, prompt and careful surveys can deter-
mine what course of action should be taken and proper excavation techniques can 
salvage and preserve the materials found. It is the achievement of this end which 
H.R. 296 seeks to accomplish. 
Id. at 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & An. NEws, at 3171 (emphasis added). The 
Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service of the Department of the Interior (HCRS) 
issued a "Statement of Program Approach" regarding the AHPA. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18117 
(1979). The HCRS specifically noted in its program statement that: 
Resource salvage generally is less preferable than preservation in situ. After 
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structive effects of development by locating, identifying and re-
moving culturally significant items. However, that approach did 
not preserve sites in their undisturbed state. 
In the 1960's, the growth of the environmental movement led 
to the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)62 in 1969. The movement also influenced the passage of a 
broad range of other laws63 and the issuance of executive orders 
addressing specialized environmental concerns. Within the emerg-
ing concept of environmental quality, cultural resource values were 
explicitly recognized as a component of a desirable quality of life. 
Many of the protections available to more familiar environmental 
interests were extended to include cultural resources. 64 In addition 
to the assimilation of cultural resource values into the general con-
cept of environmental quality, specialized protective statutes were 
designed to address narrow cultural resource issues. The National 
Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHP A)66 is a prime example of 
that development and is potentially one of the most important 
specialized federal statutes. 
The NHP A significantly extended federal cultural resource 
policy in a number of ways. First, the statute articulated a new 
federal position regarding cultural values. It emphasized the pres-
identification of resources during the initial planning stages of a project, Federal 
agencies should give full consideration to courses of action that will not necessitate 
salvage. 
Id. at 18118. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Jan. 1, 1970, PUB. L. No. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 852). 
53. See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976) (originally 
enacted as Act of Oct. 2, 1968, PUB. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906); Endangered Species Act of 
1973, id. §§ 1531-1543 (originally enacted as Act of Dec. 12, 1973, PUB. L. No. 93-205, 87 
Stat. 884). See also W. RoDGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.12 (1977); Rosen-
berg & Olson, Federal Environmental Review Requirements Other Than NEPA: The 
Emerging Challenge, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 195 (1978). 
54. The most obvious protection was the inclusion of cultural resource issues in the 
environmental impact statement required by NEPA. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. 
Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The history of the Warm Springs Dam case was 
complicated by subsequent actions for permanent injunctions on different grounds; however, 
the archeological considerations stated here were approved by all subsequent courts. See 
417 U.S. 1301 (1974) (Douglas, J., sitting as circuit judge for the Ninth Circuit); No. 74-1968 
(9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1975) (unpublished memorandum decision); 431 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Cal. 
1977); 565 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977); 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1977); Concerned About Trident v. 
Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976). 
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 
1966, PUB. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915). 
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ervation of historical and cultural properties and objects "as a liv-
ing part of our community life in order to give a sense of orienta-
tion to the American people."116 That approach deviated from 
preexisting policy by focusing on active federal encquragement of 
preservation as a protective strategy. Moreover, the underlying ra-
tionale for cultural resource protection shifted from emphasizing 
the patriotic dimension of historical preservation117 to stressing a 
sense of human orientation within the historical continuum. Sec-
ond, the Act expanded the scope of federal protection to include 
sites having local or regional importance but lacking a national sig-
nificance, 118 thereby reemphasizing that historical preservation is a 
matter of community and state importance.119 Third, the Act had 
the effect of regulating federal agency activities that might affect 
cultural resources. The NHP A required all federal agencies to con-
sult with the newly created Advisory Council on Historic Preserva-
tion60 whenever federal projects or other "undertakings" could af-
fect historically or archeologically significant sites.61 Although 
consultation was mandatory, the Council's function was intended 
to be only advisory. An executive order issued in 197162 clarified 
those agency obligations, and a later legislative change extended 
the scope of the NHPA provision to properties "eligible" for inclu-
sion on the National Register of Historic Places.63 
The full impact of the executive order and the legislative 
amendment was recognized after the Advisory Council issued im-
56. !d. § 470(b) (1976). 
57. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text. 
58. See Fowler, supra note 4, at 1484-88. 
59. Under the NHP A, financial assistance was made available to states to initiate 
"comprehensive statewide historic surveys and plans •.• for the preservation, acquisition, 
and development of [cultural properties]." 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(1) (1976). In addition, the Act 
provided matching grants to states for the actual preservation of significant historical 
properties. !d. § 470a(a)(2). Those funds, which have increased significantly since 1966, pro-
vided great incentive for state action in historical and archeological protection. 
Under the authority of the 1966 Act, a Historic Preservation Fund was established to 
finance the activities authorized by the statute. Surprisingly, support for the fund came 
from revenues derived from the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Authorized appropria-
tions for the 1977 fiscal year were $24.4 million and were increased to $150 million for the 
1981 fiscal year. See id. § 470h (1976 & Supp. m 1979). 
60. See id. §§ 470i-470t. 
61. !d. § 470(f) (1976). That subsection would seem to apply to both detrimental and 
beneficial effects of federal actions. 
62. See Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 
app., at 429 (1976). 
63. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 28, 1976, PUB. L. 
No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1313). 
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plementing regulations in early 197 4. 64 The Advisory Council pro-
cedures required a federal agency to consult with a State Historic 
Preservation Officer (SHPO) when determining how agency activi-
ties would affect historical or archeological sites.65 In certain cases, 
the procedures also required the SHPO, along with the Advisory 
Council and the interested federal agency, to reach written agree-
ment on mitigation of any adverse effects expected from a federal 
project.68 
The Advisory Council procedures placed a significant obliga-
tion on federal agencies. By itself, NEPA requires agencies to eval-
uate the effects of their activities on cultural as well as ecological 
resources. 67 The NHPA, as implemented through the Advisory 
Council procedures, often requires additional investigation and 
documentation of cultural resource impact beyond that required 
by NEPA in an environmental impact statement.68 Those addi-
tional requirements may be particularly onerous where archeologi-
cal properties are involved because their presence and precise loca-
64. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.17 (1974). 
65. Strict time limits are imposed on the SHPO, and if no response to a request for his 
opinion is received within 30 days, concurrence is presumed. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (1980). 
66. ld. § 800.6(c) (1979). The Advisory Council procedures also contain specified re--
view periods, which can delay federal projects. For instance, the Advisory Council may take 
30 days to review a "no adverse effect" determination made by a federal agency. That re-
view follows the required survey activities, consultations with the SHPO and a determina-
tion of eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places by the Heritage Conservation 
and Recreation Service. Id. § 800.4(a)(3). 
67. 42 u.s.c. § 4331(b)(4) (1976). 
68. Recent amendments to the Advisory Council's regulations were addressed to ques-
tions of NEP A compliance. Those new regulations suggested that agencies should coordi-
nate their NEP A and NHP A review processes, although at the same time, stating that the 
two statutes are "independent." 36 C.F.R. § 800.9 (1979). The Council on Environmental 
Quality regulations concerning federal environmental impact statement preparation direct 
NEP A compliance to be combined with other statutory requirements "to the fullest extent 
possible." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 (1980). In the policy statement, the proposed NEPA regula-
tions direct federal agencies, "to the fullest extent possible," to "integrate the requirements 
of NEP A with their planning and environmental review procedures so that all such proce-
dures run concurrently rather than consecutively." ld. § 1500.2(c). The intention is to 
streamline all federal environmental review. 
Cases have been brought alleging damage to cultural interests and violations of NEP A 
or NHPA or both. See WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979}; District of Columbia 
Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Adams, 571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1978); Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. 
Harris, 490 F. Supp. 1334, 1341-42 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Aertsen v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314, 
316-20 (D. Mass. 1980}; Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 692-94 (D.P.R. 1979); Hall City 
Historical Soc'y v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Further-
more, courts have found standing where plaintiffs are claiming that the demolition of an 
historical property would cause an injury in fact to their collective aesthetic interests. See 
Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 632 F.2d 21, 23-24 
(6th Cir. 1980). 
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tion usually cannot be detected without field surveys, which 
occasionally involve subsurface excavation. 
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit declared, in United States v. 
Diaz, 69 that the criminal penalty provisions of the Antiquities Act 
were unconstitutionally vague. At the time Diaz was decided, it 
was apparent that the penalties provided by the Antiquities Act, 
even if judicially upheld, would not deter those who were damaging 
archeological sites and pilfering artifacts. Because archeological ob-
jects had become extremely valuable on domestic and international 
art markets,70 the weak and infrequently imposed penalties were 
undoubtedly viewed by commercially motivated looters as a minor 
cost of doing business. The lack of an effective legal sanction, com-
bined with the tremendous area to be supervised, created a serious 
threat to the future of America's cultural resources. 
The frustration resulting from the Diaz decision and the con-
sensus of opinion that a statutory change was necessary moved 
Congress to enact the Archeological Resources Protection Act71 in 
1979. The expedited treatment of that legislation reflected a com-
mon perception that immediate action was warranted.72 Although 
Congress avoided one controversial element of the 1906 Antiquities 
Act-the unfettered presidential power to declare national monu-
ments on federallands73-it was willing to address itself to the pri-
mary task of developing a new regulatory program for the control 
of archeological exploration and recovery. 
69. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit includes Arizona, California, Ne-
vada, Idaho, Oregon, Washington and Montana. Five years after Diaz, the Tenth Circuit, in 
United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979), upheld the Antiquities Act. That 
circuit is comprised of New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Oklahoma, Kansas and Wyoming. The 
split of opinion between those two judicial circuits is significant because a great number of 
archeological sites are located in those states. 
70. See note 10 supra. 
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470ee (Supp. III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 31, 
1979, PUB. L. No. 96-95, § 2-6, 93 Stat. 721). For a discussion of that legislation, see Rosen-
berg, Federal Protection for Archeological Resources, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 701 (1981). 
72. All the witnesses who testified at the legislative hearings held on the proposed act 
agreed that a statutory amendment was necessary. See Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 
89. 
73. The seriousness of that issue can be seen in the extraordinary effort made by Sen-
ator Mike Gravel of Alaska to have the unlimited discretionary powers of the President 
restricted. See id., app. at 137-45; 125 CoNG. REc. S10,836-42 (daily ed. July 30, 1979) (re-
marks of Senator Gravel). Senator Gravel introduced an amendment to the Antiquities Act 
land withdrawal provision, which would have required a concurrent resolution of Congress 
approving any withdrawal of more than 5,000 acres. That requirement would have applied 
retroactively to invalidate an earlier presidential declaration pertaining to Alaskan lands. 
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The 1979 Act emphasized a federal permit program74 to con-
trol access to archeologically significant sites that were located on 
federal land. In an effort to avoid a constitutional attack based on 
vagueness, the statute explicitly defined a number of important 
terms, leaving no doubt about when a permit would be required.75 
In addition, the Act set out four considerations to be taken into 
account before issuing a permit for excavation on federal lands. 
First, it must be shown that an applicant is "qualified" to 
carry out the proposed activity. 78 The permit request must de-
scribe the proposed work in enough detail to enable the federal 
official to assess the applicant's technical competence to complete 
the project in a professional manner. Even though the Act substan-
tially expanded the range of persons and organizations allowed to 
excavate archeological properties,77 anyone applying for a permit 
must be shown to be qualified. That requirement could force pro-
fessional archeological organizations to license or certify their 
members to make them eligible for work on federal lands. In the 
74. That permit procedure must be considered in combination with the civil and crim-
inal sanctions also provided in the Act to comprehend the emerging congressional policy of 
cultural resource protection. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(d)-470ff (Supp. III 1979). 
75. See id. §§ 470bb-470cc. The statute states: 
Any person may apply to the Federal land manager to excavate or remove any 
archaeological resource located on public lands or Indian lands and to carry out activ-
ities associated with such excavation and removal. The application [must] contain 
such information as the Federal land manager deems necessary, including informa-
tion concerning the time, scope, and location and specific purpose of the proposed 
work. 
Id. § 470cc(a). The language of that provision should have more clearly indicated the 
mandatory nature of the application by using the words "shall apply" rather than "may 
apply" because the failure to procure such a permit could lead to the imposition of signifi-
cant criminal sanctions. See id. § 470ee(d). 
76. Id. § 470cc(b)(1). The precise nature of a permittee's requisite "qualifications" is 
uncertain because there was no discussion of the issue in the legislative debates. However, 
the Senate hearings do provide some insight. Dr. Ernest A. Connally, Associate Director of 
the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service of the Department of the Interior, in 
response to a question posed by Senator Bumpers of Arkansas, noted: 
[The new law] would change the definition somewhat, and would allow qualified per-
sons rather than just institutions as such to do it. So that it would include, for exam-
ple, State Historic Preservation Officers or other people who are qualified and might 
have the financial means of a private individual, say a philanthropist. 
[The bill] would give him the opportunity . . . to go in for an investigation with 
proper scientific personnel and equipment ... rather than limit [exploration] as 
strictly as we do at the present time to educational or scientific institutions and pro-
fessional organizations and associations linked to recognized institutions. 
Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 53. See also id. at 56. The wisdom of such an approach 
appears questionable in light of the limited supervision actually given to site exploration 
activlties. 
77. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1976) with id. §§ 470bb(6), 470cc(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
772 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1981: 755 
absence of formal professional certification, some minimum level of 
experience and training should be required to ensure high quality 
work. 
Second, the proposed activity must be "undertaken for the 
purpose of furthering archeological knowledge in the public inter-
est. "78 That requirement reserves authorized exploration on federal 
lands for noncommercial purposes and ensures that the nation's 
cultural resources will only be disturbed for the advancement of 
scientific knowledge and ,public understanding. 
Third, the archeological resources removed from the site re-
main the property of the United States; those items, along with 
associated archeological records and data, must be preserved by a 
suitable institution.79 That provision reiterates the position that 
artifacts found on federal land are a national resource unavailable 
for private ownership. 80 It also emphasizes the importance of pre-
serving not only the artifact itself but the scientific data derived in 
the course of investigating the site. Also reflected, however, is the 
policy that federal lands are available for exploration81 and that 
material remains of prior cultures found on federal land may be 
removed. The statute does not express support for a preservation 
78. Id. § 470cc(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979). 
79. Id. § 470cc(b)(3). It may be difficult to keep the artifacts and the related data 
physically together because archeological resources may be transferred between universities, 
museums or other institutions. The Act invites the Secretary of Interior to develop regula-
tions governing the exchange between institutions of archeological resources from federal or 
Indian lands. I d. § 470dd(1). It also permits the Interior Department to establish rules gov-
erning the "ultimate disposition" of both newly discovered items and those found under 
prior authorities. I d. § 470dd(2). The meaning of that provision is unclear. In all cases where 
archeological resources are taken from Indian lands, the consent of the Indian or Indian 
tribe owning the land or having jurisdiction must be received before the resource can be 
transferred. Id. § 470dd. 
By comparison, state laws usually clearly establish title to artifacts discovered on state 
lands in the state and often define the location of state repositories for the uncovered items. 
See, e.g., DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 7, § 5304 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12(3) (West 1975). 
Some states limit excavation permits to state residents and forbid the removal of artifacts 
from the jurisdiction. See, e.g., ALA. ConE §§ 41-3-2, -5 (1977). 
80. See 43 C.F.R. § 3.17 (1980). 
81. The Archeological Resources Protection Act allows exploration on lands having 
religious as well as scientific significance. The Act only requires the federal land manager 
issuing a permit to notify "any Indian tribe which may consider the site as having religious 
or cultural importance." 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (Supp. III 1979). That procedure may conflict 
with the provisions of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1966 (Supp. 
III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 11, 1978, PUB. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469), which 
declared the federal policy "to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent 
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions • . . including but 
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects and the freedom to wor-
ship through ceremonials and traditional rites." Id. 
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oriented theory favoring the protection of significant sites. In that 
subtle way, the 1979 Act may encourage the destruction of sites to 
preserve particular artifacts. 
The fourth requirement for issuance of a permit is that the 
proposed work plan must not be "inconsistent with any manage-
ment plan" applicable to the land involved. 82 In effect, a permit 
proposal may not be granted if it will unreasonably interfere with 
another use of the land, such as grazing, mining, oil and gas explo-
ration, forestry or land reclamation. Through thai condition, Con-
gress made certain that the protective purpose of the Act, which 
was to regulate archeological site exploration and excavation and 
to deter commercially motivated looters, would not be used to im-
pose additional restrictions on development activity review re-
quirements. 83 For that reason, the permit procedure was statutorily 
freed from the review requirements of the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act,8 " although multiple use activities remain subject to 
the specialized review process required by that statute. 811 
The 1979 Act combined a permit program with enhanced en-
forcement techniques in the form of strengthened civil and crimi-
nal penalties to deter illicit excavation of sites, 86 but required a 
high level of surveillance and enforcement by federal land mana-
gers. The Act demonstrated continued congressional support for 
archeological site and artifact protection within the context of fed-
eralland management. As a reinforcement and further articulation 
of the 1906 Antiquities Act coverage, however, the 1979 statute is 
limited in its scope to federal lands. The Act made no effort to 
extend any federal regulatory power to nonfederal lands. Conse-
quently, state and privately owned lands possessing significant 
archeological resources may be excavated without any federal in-
tervention. In the absence of other legal restrictions, that lack of 
federal regulation could result in the loss of irreplaceable sites, ar-
82. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(4) (Supp. III 1979). 
83. The House Committee Report reflected the belief that properly authorized multi-
ple use activities would protect archeological sites from disturbance. See H.R. REP. No. 311, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979). The implication to be drawn from that report is that archeo-
logical resources are better protected under the NHP A and the NEP A than under the 
ARPA. See notes 54, 60-68 supra and accompanying text. 
84. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(i) (Supp. III 1979). See also notes 60-68 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976). The regulations issued by the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation implement the review process and make clear the broad range of fed-
eral and federally related actions for which an evaluation of effect must be made. See 36 
C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (1980). 
86. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470cc, 470ee, 470ft' (Supp. III 1979). 
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tifacts and information. 
The next section of this article will discuss and evaluate the 
broad variety of state and local policies and legal techniques that 
can be employed to protect archeological resources. 
II. OVERVIEW OF STATE ARcHEOLOGY LEGISLATION 
Before examining specific features of state archeology legisla-
tion, several general points are worth noting. First, laws protecting 
archeological sites and artifacts exist in almost every jurisdiction. 
Because some states enacted legislation as early as 1906, while 
others acted only within the last decade, there is a wide range in 
the approaches to and the scope of government intervention. Sec-
ond, there is a great variation in the complexity and detail of legis-
lation in states having archeology protection laws. Those variations 
reflect the tendency of legislative draftsmen to focus on regionally 
different archeological interests rather than following a uniform 
model in formulating their state programs. Some states have been 
primarily concerned about underwater archeology or American In-
dian sites; others have sought to protect colonial or prehistoric 
sites. Finally, it is apparent that states have established new arche-
ological programs or have recently reinforced existing ones to es-
tablish eligibility for funding under the NHP A. A closer analysis of 
the specific approaches and legal techniques employed throughout 
the nation will reveal the rich variety of state law options available 
to protect archeological resources. 
A. Policy Statements 
It is not uncommon in the articulation of state cultural re-
source policy to find a statement that it is within the public inter-
est to protect enumerated places and objects to preserve the cul-
tural heritage of the state,87 or to fulfill a moral obligation to 
succeeding generations to preserve irreplaceable state values.88 
Most states declare, either by statute or constitutional provision, 
87. See, e.g., WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 27.53.010 (Supp. 1980). The concept of states' 
cultural history and that of Native American groups or other individuals can come into 
conflict. For instance, the professional interests of the archeologist and agency planner can 
be diametrically opposed to that of Native Americans. See, e.g., Winter, Indian Heritage 
Preservation and Archeologists, 45 AM. ANTIQUITIES 121 (1980). State policy encouraging 
the excavation of burial sites can raise serious ethical problems. For an excellent discussion 
of that issue, see Rosen, The Excavation of American Indian Burial Sites: A Problem in 
Law and Professional Responsibility, 82 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 5 (1980). 
88. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1047.1b(3), (6) (Purdon Supp. 1981). 
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that the protection of cultural resources, including archeological 
sites, constitutes a public benefit. 89 Those statements recognize, in 
one fashion or another, the importance of historical places to the 
citizens of the state.90 Some states' policy declarations have estab-
lished cultural resources as important environmental assets and, 
consequently, have incorporated them into an expanding environ-
mental quality concept. 91 Other states have emphasized the impor-
tance of protecting archeological sites and objects threatened by 
encroaching human activities because they are unique sources of 
scientific information. 92 A number of jurisdictions have authorized 
comprehensive programs of historical preservation to promote the 
use and conservation of historical properties for the "education, in-
spiration, pleasure, and enrichment" of the citizenry.93 Finally, leg-
islative or constitutional policy statements often specifically au-
thorize, as a protective measure, the acquisition of archeological or 
89. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-904 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Arkansas statute pro-
vides a sweeping declaration of state policy favoring cultural resource protection: 
I d. 
The General Assembly hereby determines that the historical, archeological, architec-
tural, and cultural heritage of Arkansas is among the most important economic and 
environmental assets of this State and that rapid development threatens to remove 
the remaining vestiges of Arkansas' proud and unique heritage. Therefore, it is 
hereby declared to be public policy and in the best interests of the general economic, 
social, and educational welfare of all the citi2ens of Arkansas for this State to engage 
in a comprehensive program of historic preservation, undertaken at all levels of the 
government of Arkansas and its political subdivisions, to promote the use and preser-
vation of such property for the public interest and the education, inspiration, plea-
sure, and enrichment of the citizens of this State. 
90. See ALAsKA STAT. § 41.35.010 (Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-904 (Supp. 1979); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.061 (West 1975); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE§ 67-
4119 (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-2715 (1977); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.705 (Baldwin 
1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1601 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 371 
(1974); Mo. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 2-301 (1974); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 399.202 (1976); Miss. 
CoDE ANN. § 39-7-3 (1973); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. §§ 22-3-101, 23-1-101 (1979); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 227-C:1 (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 55-10-01 
(1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1b (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-2 
(1977); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 1-20-17 (1980); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-18-18 (1978); VA. 
CODE§ 10-150.2 (1978); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 27.53.010 (Supp. 1981). 
91. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227-C:1 (1978), which provides: 
The legislature of New Hampshire has determined that the historical, archeologi-
cal, architectural and cultural heritage of New Hampshire is among the most impor-
tant environmental assets of the state and that the rapid social and economic devel-
opment of contemporary society threatens the remaining vestiges of this heritage 
See also HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-1 (1976). 
92. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.705 (Baldwin 1977); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 
27, § 372 (197 4). 
93. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2715 (1977). 
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historical properties through condemnation. 94 
To accomplish those generally stated purposes, state programs 
have been authorized to manage cultural resources within the 
framework of state government. Often, the archeological values of 
a state are encompassed within the broader definition of historical 
properties or cultural resources and are, thus, under the control of 
the state's historical preservation program. However, there are ex-
amples of independent policy statements regarding archeological 
resources95 that are usually effectuated by separate organizational 
structures having jurisdiction over archeological sites and artifacts. 
B. State Regulatory Control of Activities on State Land 
The vast majority of states have established regulatory con-
trols to prevent the unauthorized excavation of archeological sites 
located on state lands.98 State statutes normally prohibit the ex-
ploration and excavation of sites and the removal of artifacts with-
out a state issued permit,97 thereby seeking to control permissible 
94. See MoNT. CoNST. art. IX, § 4. See also notes 183-185 infra and accompanying 
text. 
95. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.705 (Baldwin 1977). 
96. See .ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.080 (Supp. 1977); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-842 (1974); 
CAL. PUB. REs. ConE§ 5097.5 (West 1972); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 24-80-406 (1974); DEL. ConE 
ANN. tit. 7, § 5302 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); GA. ConE ANN. § 40-813a 
(1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133c3 (Smith-Hurd 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5403 
(1980); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.720 (Baldwin 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1605 (West 
Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 374 (1974); MD. NAT. REs. ConE ANN. §§ 2-305 to 
-306 (1974); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 9, § 27C (West 1976); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 299.53 
(1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.36 (West 1979); Miss. ConE ANN. § 39-1-19 (1972); MoNT. 
REv. ConEs ANN. §§ 22-3-432, -442 (1979); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 381.199-.283 (1979); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-6-9(B) (1978); N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 233(5) (McKinney 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 70-4 (1981) (indian relics); id. § 121-25 (shipwrecks); N.D. CENT. ConE § 55-03-01 (1972); 
OHIO REv. ConE ANN. § 149-54 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309 (West 1972); 
OR. REv. STAT. § 97.745 (1979) (indian graves); id. § 273.705(a) (historical and archeological 
materials); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1047.1c, .1i (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 42-
45.1-5, -10, -12 (1977); S.C. ConE§ 54-7-230 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN.§§ 1-20-
31, -32 (1980); TENN. ConE ANN. § 11-6-105 (1980); TEx. REs. ConE ANN. tit. 9, § 191.093 
(Vernon 1978); UTAH ConE ANN.§ 63-18-25 (1978); VA. ConE§ 10-145.9(C) (1981) (underwa-
ter); id. § 10-150.5 (1978) (objects of antiquity); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 27.53.060 (Supp. 
1979); W.VA. CoDE§ 29-1-7 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 27.012 (West 1973); WYo. STAT.§ 36-
1-114 (1977). 
97. Statutes vary greatly in the specificity with which they describe the prohibited 
conduct. Compare WASH. REV. ConE ANN.§ 27.53.060 (Supp. 1980) with WYo. STAT.§ 36-1-
114 (1977). Statutes also vary in the way they describe protected archeological resources. 
For instance, Virginia statutes employ the term "object of antiquity" to denominate the 
items to be protected. Probably drawn from the federal Antiquities Act of 1906, that term 
was found unconstitutionally vague by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 
113 (9th Cir. 1974). See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text. Fortunately, the Virginia 
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site exploration and eliminate site looting. As under federallaw,98 
violation of a prohibition against unpermitted site activity usually 
constitutes a minor criminal infraction punishable by relatively 
short imprisonment or modest fines or both.99 In addition to fines 
or imprisonment, state criminal laws may require a convicted per-
son to forfeit the archeological artifacts illegally removed from a 
protected site.100 
As with the federal program, 101 states generally make permits 
available only to parties who possess a demonstrated professional 
competence in archeological investigation.102 However, a number of 
legislature defined the term in another section of the statute. See VA. CoDE § 10-150.3(E) 
(1978). 
98. See notes 27, 86 supra and accompanying text. 
99. As a general proposition, state criminal laws treat the pillage of archeological sites 
as a relatively insignificant offense; consequently, they provide little deterrence against loot-
ing. Moreover, the absence of reported cases suggests that detection and prosecution of 
those offenses occurs only infrequently. 
Typically, criminal penalty provisions specify maximum punishments of up to six 
months imprisonment and up to $500 in fines. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-846 
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.13(1) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5408 (1980); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1k (Purdon Supp. 1981); W.VA. CODE§ 29-1-7 (1980). Virginia has 
enacted the most stringent criminal penalty provision by classifying the violation as a class 
1 misdemeanor, punishable with a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to 12 
months or both. VA. CODE § 10-150.10 (1978). Virginia also requires the forfeiture of all 
underwater historical objects illegally recovered, id. § 10-145.9(E), but does not require for-
feiture of objects of antiquity found on land, id. § 10-150.10. Some states only impose a fine 
of $10 for conviction. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 299.55 (1967). Others punish with an 
optional jail term as short as 10 days. See, e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 11-6-112 (1980). A review 
of state criminal penalty provisions indicates that the statutory maximum punishment for 
archeological site damage and looting is far less than the cost of damage caused. The penal-
ties available under federal law are far more stringent. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(d), 470ff(a)(2) 
(Supp. III 1979). However, Idaho has enacted a unique treble damages civil penalty provid-
ing "triple the amount of the cost and expense of repairing, replacing, and reconstructing 
said [archeological] site •••. " IDAHO CoDE § 67-4118 (1973). 
100. At least 12 states require forfeiture of illegally taken objects. See IDAHo CODE § 
67-4122 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5408 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 381.223 (1979); N.D. 
CENT. CoDE § 55-03-07 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309(h) (West 1972); OR. REv. 
STAT. § 273.711 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1k (Purdon Supp. 1981); S.D. CoDIFIED 
LAws ANN. § 1-20-35 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 791 (1978); VA. CoDE § 10-145.9(E) 
(1978); WYo. STAT. § 36-1-116 (1977). Considering the escalating value of archeological arti-
facts on the national and international art markets, forfeiture of illegally removed objects 
should be uniformly required to dissuade commercially motivated looters. Federal law goes 
even further by providing for the forfeiture not only of the illegally taken archeological re-
sources but also "all vehicles and equipment • • • which were used in connection with such 
violation." 16 U.S.C. § 470gg(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
101. See generally notes 74-85 supra and accompanying text. 
102. A number of statutes allow the permitting agency to determine the attributes of a 
qualified permittee. See, e.g., F'LA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, 
§ 133c4 (Smith-Hurd 1967); MD. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 2-306 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 
9, § 27C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 138.36(2) (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
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jurisdictions require no showing of expertise or experience to ob-
tain a permit, 103 and some allow amateurs to undertake field 
explorations.104 
With one significant exception, 105 state regulatory control of 
archeological sites limits lawful excavation to those activities con-
ducted in the public interest106 and denies a permittee any reward 
from the artifacts found at the site. Some states insist that archeo-
70, § 8339(b) (West 1972). Others provide specific statutory guidance. See, e.g., NEv. REV. 
STAT. § 381.203 (1979) (four-part test). 
103. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-7 (1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1605 (West Supp. 
1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 374 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.53 (1967); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1i(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981); Wvo. 
STAT. § 36-1-114 (1977). 
104. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 764 (1978); VA. CoDE§ 10-150.5(8) (1978). Because 
of the minimal governmental supervision of excavation, granting permits to amateur arche-
ologists may be undesirable. The use of improper techniques could result in site damage and 
loss of unique data. The State of Washington, while allowing amateur societies to undertake 
excavations, requires that a written proposal "detailing the scope and duration of the activ-
ity" be reviewed by an expert state agency prior to approval. See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 
27.53.080 (Supp. 1980). 
105. States with underwater archeological resources often have statutes that regard 
the sunken shipwrecks within state waters as salvage items within a traditional maritime 
context. Specifically, states allow salvors a percentage of the salvaged materials as compen-
sation for their activities. Such a reward system is unfortunate because it encourages salvage 
operations that consider the recovered materials more a financial treasure than a unique 
archeological resource. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.1605, .1606 (West Supp. 1980) (per-
centage of cash value of objects recovered); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 39-7-17 (1973) (percentage of 
cash value of objects recovered); NEv. REv. STAT. § 381.207 (1979) (50% of artifacts to per-
mittee); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1981) (portion of all relics may be sold or retained by the 
licensee); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309(a) (West 1972) (retention of 50% of all "articles, 
implements and material found or discovered"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-5 (1977) ("fair 
compensation to the permittee for underwater historic property recovered"); S.C. ConE §§ 
54-7-230(a)-(b) (Supp. 1980) ("licensee's equity ... shall not be less than fifty percent arti-
facts or value of the artifacts recovered"); VA. CoDE § 10-145.9(C) (Supp. 1981) (fair share of 
the objects recovered or a reasonable percentage of the cash value); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-
18-25 (1978) ("a fair share of the items recovered"). But cf. S.C. CoDE § 1-20-25 (1974) (all 
such "information and objects deriving from state lands shall remain the property of the 
state and be utilized for scientific or public educational purposes"). 
Even professional archeologists have been reluctant to consider shipwrecks and other 
underwater materials as archeologically important as land sites. See Cockrell, The Trouble 
with Treasure-A Preservationist View of the Controversy, 45 AM. ANTIQUITY 333 (1980). 
106. The permit process is frequently available only to those applicants who intend to 
further a scientific or educational objective. The Montana statute is typical in its expression 
of that public benefit rationale. The legislation authorizes permits to "reputable museums, 
universities, colleges or other . . • institutions . . . with a view toward dissemination of 
knowledge about cultural properties." MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 81-2505(a) (Supp. 1977). 
See also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 5302 (1974) (excavation "with a view to increase 
knowledge"); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-813a (1975) (permits granted "solely for scientific or pub-
lic educational purposes"). A specific articulation of that principle is most important be-
cause it expresses a policy of reserving archeological exploration solely for the public's bene-
fit and not for personal financial gain. 
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logical materials discovered at the site of a permitted exploration 
and all records pertaining to the activity are the property of the 
state107 and must be transferred to state custody at the conclusion 
of the excavation. Assertions of title to artifacts recovered from 
archeological sites on state lands have been justified on the theory 
that objects buried underground are owned by the titleholder of 
the real property.108 Because the state is the owner of the land, it 
also owns articles found buried· in the ground.109 
The permit programs conducted by state governments are fo-
cused solely on excavation conducted on state, and sometimes lo-
cal, government lands.110 Although state legislation often speaks in 
terms of the protection and preservation of sites, that is not the 
primary goal. Archeological permit programs represent state super-
vision of private activities on public lands-a land management 
rather than an explicitly preservationist function. One notable 
omission from most state statutes is the concept of continuing su-
pervisory responsibility over permitted activities.m Authorized 
site exploration should be supervised by competent state personnel 
107. See, e.g., ALA. ConE § 41-3-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.020 (Supp. 1977); ARK. 
STAT. ANN. § 8-802 (1976); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-80-401 (1973); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 
5302, 5304 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12(3) (West 1975); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-7 
(1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1605 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 374 
(1974); Mn. NAT. REs. ConE ANN. § 2-309 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.37 (West 1979); 
Miss. ConE ANN. §§ 39-7-9, -11 (1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 121-22 (1974); N.D. CENT. ConE § 
44-03-02 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309(a) (West 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-45.1-4 
to -5 (1977); S.C. ConE § 54-1-210 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-20-25, -34 
(1980); TENN. ConE ANN. § 11-6-104 (1980); UTAH ConE ANN. § 63-18-25 (1978); VA. ConE§ 
10-145.9 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 27.012(5) (West 1973). 
108. Colorado's statute and declaration of purpose typifies others, providing: 
The state of Colorado reserves to itself title to all historical, prehistorical, and archeo-
logical resources in all lands, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and other areas owned by the 
state or any of its political subdivisions. Historical, prehistorical, and archeological 
resources shall include all deposits, structures, or objects which provide information 
pertaining to the historical or prehistorical culture of people within the boundaries of 
the state of Colorado, as well as fossils and other remains of animals, plants, insects, 
and other objects of natural history within such boundaries. 
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-89-401(1) (1973). For a less specific declaration of title, see Mn. NAT. 
REs. ConE ANN. § 2-309 (1974). 
109. See note 11 supra. 
110. Occasionally, state permit programs apply to sites on both state and local govern-
ment lands. See, e.g., IDAHO ConE § 67-4120 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-540:f to -5404 
(1980); Kv. REV. STAT. § 164.720 (1977); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 9, § 27C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 
1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.31(2), .36(2) (West 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 39-7-11 (1972). 
However, permit programs apply only to lands owned by or under the control of the state. 
111. Continuing supervision could only occur if there was sufficient state or federal 
funding to support the formation of a group of highly trained officials who would be present 
at excavation sites to represent the state's interest. 
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to ensure that proper techniques are being employed and that all 
discoveries are being reported. 
An examination of state law also reveals that permit programs 
apply only to governmental lands and do not place legal obliga-
tions on the private landowner in the use of his land.112 Because no 
state has claimed ownership or control over artifacts found on pri-
vate property, an individual may investigate and excavate his land 
without any form of governmental intervention; any artifact dis-
covered is considered the property of the landowner. Moreover, 
there is no legal prohibition against landowners intentionally de-
stroying artifacts or sites located on their own property, although 
many states encourage landowners to comply voluntarily with the 
permit requirements applicable to state land, 113 and others create 
an affirmative duty to report discovery of an archeological site or 
artifact to a state agency.114 Aside from those limited provisions, 
112. For instance, the North Dakota statute requires a state permit "before making 
any investigation, exploration, or excavation of any prehistoric or historical [sites] on any 
lands in North Dakota." N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-03-01 (1972) (emphasis added). Another 
section of the statute, however, specifically declares: "Nothing contained in this chapter 
shall be construed to limit or prohibit any person owning land in this state from exploring 
or excavating for archeological or paleontological material on his own land or by written 
consent to any other person." Id. § 55-03-05. Professor Robert E. Beck, noting the disparate 
treatment of public and private lands, has suggested that private landowners could be re-
quired to apply for digging permits on their own lands. He adds, however, that the permits 
·could not be denied by the state. Beck, North Dakota's Historic Preservation Law, 53 N.D. 
L. REv. 177, 190-92 (1976). Although a permit requirement would give the state notice of an 
impending excavation, it would not effectively protect sites, and it would probably be ig-
nored by private landowners. 
113. The Arkansas statute provides: 
It is a declaration and statement of legislative intent that field archeology on pri-
vately owned lands should be discouraged except in accordance with both the provi-
sions and spirit of this Act [§§ 8-801 to -808]; and persons having knowledge of the 
location of archeological sites are encouraged to communicate such information to the 
Arkansas Archeological Survey. 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-802 (1976). See also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 5305 (1974); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 267.14 (West 1975); GA. CoDE ANN. § 40-813a (1975); MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 2-
301 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.32 (West 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-10(A) (1980); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 70-1 (1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-20-29 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 63-18-27 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 27.53.070 (1979). 
114. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-10(a) (1976) (90 days notice before any construction, 
alteration, disposition or improvement); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1610 (West Supp. 1980) 
(90 days notice); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 361 (1974) (no minimum time required, but 
notice must be given); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-27 (1978) (immediate notification). The 
Hawaii statute is noteworthy because it permits the State Department of Land and Natural 
Resources to condemn threatened properties discovered through the statutory notice re-
quirement. See HAWAII REv. STAT.§§ 6E-10(a), (d) (1976).·A similar provision exists in New 
Mexico. See N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 18-6-10(C)(1)-(5) (1978).(permitting condemnation or zon-
ing to preserve site). 
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state control over activities adversely affecting archeological 
properties located on private property is virtually nonexistent. 
C. State Review of Development Projects Affecting Archeologi-
cal Resources 
Archeological properties may be adversely affected by direct 
governmental action. Federal statutes have made federal agencies 
aware of the impact their actions may have on historical and 
archeological resources and, through sensitive project planning, 
have required them to avoid unnecessary harmful effects. However, 
those federal laws do not reach the myriad of state and local activi-
ties that affect cultural properties. Recognizing that state and local 
government action can be as damaging to archeological resources 
as any federal undertaking, many states have enacted statutes to 
regulate and coordinate state and local government actions to, at 
best, avoid the loss of archeological sites and artifacts or, at least, 
make government planners aware of cultural resource interests at 
an early stage of project planning. A number of statutes advise 
state agencies and local governments to cooperate with cultural re-
source oversight agencies.1115 However, those statutes have rela-
tively little value because they do not impose specific obligations to 
notify and consult with cultural resource agencies to minimize the 
negative effects of state actions on archeological properties. In at 
least one jurisdiction, the state archeological department is di-
rected to inform public agencies of the location of archeological 
sites so they can be avoided in project planning.116 That procedure 
allows state agencies to voluntarily integrate consideration of 
archeological site location into their internal processes and long 
115. See e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41:1613 (West Supp. 1980); VA. CoDE § 10-
150.2(B) (1978). 
116. As part of a multifaceted system of government regulation, the Alaska statute 
requires that "the department [of Natural Resources] shall locate, identify and preserve in 
suitable records information regarding historic, prehistoric and archeological sites, locations 
and remains. The information shall be submitted to the executive departments of the 
state." ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070(a) (1977). North Dakota accomplishes the same result by 
stating as a matter of law that "[t]he state, its departments and agencies, each city, county, 
school district, and other body politic, are by this chapter notified of the existence of state 
historic sites ... listed in the state historic sites registry." N.D. CENT. CoDE § 55-10-08(1) 
(Supp. 1979). 
Federal law and the law of the State of Washington restrict access to archeological re-
source site information. See 16 U.S.C. § 470hh (Supp. III 1979); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 
42.17.310(1)(k) (1979). There is justification in limiting access to site location data because 
commercially motivated site looters could acquire public information and use it for their 
illicit purposes. 
782 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1981: 755 
term planning.117 
The vast majority of states that subject agency and local gov-
ernment development decisions to a cultural resource impact re-
view have modeled their procedures, to some extent, after the fed-
eral system.118 That system requires federal agencies undertaking 
potentially damaging actions to obtain the comments of the Advi-
sory Council on Historic Preservation before proceeding with the 
proposed project.119 Often, the Advisory Council can secure a 
memorandum of agreement with the project agency requiring it to 
mitigate the adverse effect of its proposed action on cultural 
properties.120 In the state law context, state and local governments 
are usually required to notify the state archeologist or historical 
preservation agency prior to taking any action that will or may 
have an adverse effect on archeological sites.121 The purpose of the 
notice requirement in most jurisdictions is to provide a hiatus dur-
ing which state archeologists can salvage any significant arti-
facts. 122 The primary emphasis of those statutes is not to prevent 
117. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 44.22(7) (West 1979). 
118. The North Carolina statute employs language most similar to that of federal law: 
[T]he head of any State agency having a direct or indirect jurisdiction over a pro-
, posed State or state-assisted undertaking, or the head of any State department, 
board, commission, or independent agency having authority to build, construct, oper-
ate, license, authorize, assist, or approve any State or state-assisted undertaking, 
shall, prior to the approval of any State funds for the undertaking, or prior to any 
approval, license, or authorization as the case may be, take into account the effect of 
the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is listed in 
the National Register of Historic Places .... 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-12(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 
119. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4 (1979). 
120. Id. § 800.8. 
121. The advance notification obligation is a common feature of fifteen states' archeo-
logical statutes. However, the review, investigation and salvage requirement applies to vary-
ing numbers of state and local governmental entities. See ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070 (Supp. 
1977) (state, state agency, state licensee); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-803 (1976) (state agencies, 
departments, institutions and commissions, counties and municipalities); CAL. PuB. RES. 
CoDE § 5097.1 (West 1972) (state agencies); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-8 (1976) (state agencies, 
officers, political subdivisions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 (1977) (state, political subdivi-
sions and instrumentalities); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.40 (West 1979) (state and other gov-
ernment agencies); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-12(a) (1974) (state agencies, departments, boards, 
commissions, independent agencies); N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08 (Supp. 1979) (state, de-
partments, agencies, cities, counties, school districts, other bodies corporate and political); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1047.1c, .1j (Purdon Supp. 1981) (all public officials); R.I. GEN. 
LAws § 42-45.1-7 (1977) (state agencies, departments, institutions, commissions, municipali-
ties); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-20-22 (1980) (state departments, institutions, agencies, 
political subdivisions); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-18-37 (1978) (state agencies); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 767 (1978) (state agencies, departments, commissions, institutions, municipalities); 
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.22(2)(a), (7) (West 1979) (state agencies). 
122. The Rhode Island statute is typical: 
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site disturbance but to postpone the state agency's planned activi-
ties until objects of interest have been removed.123 
In all but four instances/2' state cultural resource agencies are 
powerless to interfere with the ultimate decision to proceed with a 
planned project. Although there may be valid reasons for denying 
state archeologists absolute power to veto development proposals 
of other governmental entities, in appropriate situations, the deci-
sion to preserve a site rather than salvage the artifacts and data 
available from the site should be made by an external board or 
perhaps by the governor of the state. That type of conflict resolu-
tion procedure would enable a state archeological agency to advo-
cate cultural resource preservation within the structure of state 
government. 
An alternative procedure could be modeled after the special-
ized administrative committee technique included in the federal 
Endangered Species Act/211 which established a bifurcated admin-
istrative process to resolve governmental development/wildlife con-
flicts and placed the ultimate decisionmaking authority in a com-
All state agencies, departments, institutions, and commissions, as well as all munici-
palities, shall cooperate fully with the historical preservation commission in the pres-
ervation, protection, evacuation, and evaluation of specimens and sites and to that 
end: 
(a) When any state or municipal agency finds or is made aware by an appropriate 
historical or archeological authority that its operation in connection with any state, 
state assisted, state licensed, or contracted project, activity, or program adversely af-
fects or may adversely affect scientific, historical, or archeological data, such agency 
shall notify the state historical preservation commission and shall provide the com-
mission with appropriate information concerning the project, program or activity. 
The provisions of this chapter shall be made known to contractors by the state agen-
cies doing the contracting. 
(b) The state historical presevation commission, upon such notification, shall, af-
ter reasonable notice to the responsible agency, conduct a field investigation. 
(c) The state historical preservation commission shall initiate actions within 
thirty (30) days of notification under subsection (a) or within such time as agreed 
upon by the parties involved. The responsible agency is authorized to expend agency 
funds for the purpose of assisting said commission with such field investigations. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-7 (1977). 
123. Those state salvage systems are similar to the program authorized by the federal 
Reservoir Salvage Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c (1976 & Supp. III 1979). · 
124. See ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070(e) (Supp. 1977) (decision to governor); HAWAII REv. 
STAT. § 6E-8(a) (1976) (decision to governor); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 (1977) (decision to 
governor subject to judicial review); N.D. CENT. ConE § 55-10-08(2) (Supp. 1979) (no review 
of state historical board). 
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III 1979). The Endangered Species Committee, composed 
of seven agency heads, id. § 1536(e)(3), is directed to evaluate requests from the Act's pro-
tective species policy under specifically articulated standards. Id. § 1536(h)(1). See Rosen-
berg, Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened 
Species, 58 N.C. L. REv.,,491, 545-56 (1980). 
784 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1981: 755 
mittee composed of agency heads. Development-oriented agencies 
would probably be more willing to consult with archeological offi-
cials early in project planning if the ultimate decision was made by 
an internal board. That system would also encourage agencies to 
adopt suggested project design and location modifications to ob-
tain the concurrence of the state archeological agency. A legislative 
amendment would be the most appropriate way to establish such a 
procedure. 
D. Other State Regulatory Provisions 
Cultural resource interests are recognized in environmental 
policy and impact statement laws, critical areas legislation, mining 
and energy facility siting statutes, and local government planning 
and land use control authority. Each of those sources of authority 
permits state and local governments some control over adverse im-
pacts on archeological and historical properties. 
1. State Environmental Policy and Impact Statement Stat-
utes-One of the many accomplishments of NEP A 126 was the ar-
ticulation of a national environmental policy, applicable to federal 
government actions. The Act prescribed a decisionmaking process 
that requires evaluation of the environmental effects of a federal 
activity during the planning stage by means of the environmental 
impact statement.127 Importantly, NEPA expanded the concept of 
environmental quality to include cultural resources.128 Following 
the enactment of NEP A in 1969, many states passed environmen-
tal protection legislation, often very similar to the federal stat-
ute.129 Consequently, state environmental policy statutes often in-
clude cultural resources as protected environmental values130 and, 
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1976). See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text. 
127. I d. § 4332(2) (c). 
128. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
129. At least 15 states have enacted environmental policy statutes similar to NEP A. 
See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1401 to -1416 (1976 & Supp. 1981); CAL. PUB. REs. ConE §§ 21000-
21176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-1 to -76 (1980); IND. ConE ANN. 
§§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (Bums 1981); Mn. NAT. REs. ConE ANN. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1974 & Supp. 
1980); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-
.13 (West 1977); MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -324 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
2A:35A-1 to -14, 13:19-7 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. ENVIR. CoNSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 
-0109 (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -10 (1978); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS 
ANN.§§ 34A-9-1 to -13 (1977); VA. CODE§§ 10-17.107-.112 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 
43.21C.010-.910 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West Supp. 1979). See generally W. 
RoDGERS, supra note 53, at 809-22. 
130. All the statutes mentioned in note 129 supra, except North Carolina's and Wis-
consin's, specifically recognize cultural resource values within t~e environmental quality 
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therefore, have potential for providing an additional level of pro-
tection for culturally significant properties. 
State environmental statutes have assumed two general 
forms. 131 The majority of states have followed the pattern of fed-
eral law by establishing a state policy requiring an environmental 
impact evaluation of governmental action and authorizing inter-
agency consultation and review of proposals.132 Although applica-
ble to a variety of actions, the environmental impact statements 
required by most of those statutes include consideration of cultural 
resource issues. Moreover, the environmental review requirements 
have provided private litigants standing to challenge state 
decisionmaking. 
A second type of state statute provides declaratory and injunc-
tive relief for environmental damage.133 Under those statutes, the 
concept of environmental quality encompasses cultural properties. 
The intent underlying the equitable remedy statutes is to provide 
groups and individuals access to the courts to achieve their envi-
ronmental protection goals. Although compliance with existing 
statutes, regulations and ordinances constitutes a defense to the 
authorized civil action, it appears that litigants may employ the 
environmental quality statutes to restrain both private and public 
actions threatening archeological properties. The effectiveness of 
those statutes will undoubtedly depend on the willingness of the 
courts to view archeological resources as important subjects of 
public trust. 
2. Critical Areas Legislation-A number of jurisdictions 
have recognized the unique qualities of and threats to certain land 
within their borders and have enacted laws designed to protect 
concept. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1a (1981); N.Y. ENVIR. CoNSERV. LAw § 8-0105(6) 
(McKinney Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 10-17.107(a) (1978). Recent cases affirm that statutory 
intent. See, e.g., Society for Cal. Archeology v. Butte County, 65 Cal. App. 3d 832, 837, 135 
Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1977). But see Hoboken Environment Comm. v. German Seaman's Mis-
sion, 161 N.J. Super. 256, 391 A.2d 577 (1978) (limiting environmental values to those relat-
ing to the natural environment). 
131. A third approach to environmental protection at the state level involves the des-
ignation and acquisition of environmentally significant areas. See notes 174-194 infra and 
accompanying text. Archeological properties have been included within that protective sys-
tem. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1403, -1409(b), -1409(f) (1976 & Supp. 1981). 
132. See, e.g., MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 75-1-201 (1979). 
133. That statutory form originated in Michigan legislation enacted in 1970 to provide 
what has been termed an "environmental cause of action." See MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 
691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1981). Early experience under the Michigan act is described in Sax & 
Dimento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the Michigan En-
vironmental Protection Act, 4 EcoLOGY L.Q. 7 (1974). Other states have enacted similar 
laws. See Note, Minnesota's Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 575 (1972). 
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it.134 Some states have formally designated fragile,135 critical136 or 
natural137 areas as preferred land use categories and have sought to 
preserve them through state acquisition programs138 or state land 
use regulation.139 Significantly, those protective state programs 
often reach lands having archeological or historical importance and 
thus provide additional protection for cultural resource properties. 
Such programs, however, may lead to unnecessary duplication of 
regulatory requirements and a lack of coordination between state 
agencies responsible for cultural resources and those responsible 
for other critical areas. 
3. Mining and Energy Facility Siting Statutes-States also 
have exercised regulatory control over a limited range of privately 
sponsored activities with potential for damaging archeological 
properties. For instance, the siting of electric generating facilities 
is usually supervised and approved through licensing procedures 
administered by a state public utilities commission.140 A number of 
state legislatures have set out standards for the regulatory agency 
to follow when considering potential plant sites. In at least two ju-
risdictions, New York141 and California/42 those criteria are em-
ployed to minimize adverse environmental effects, including the 
impact of siting decisions on archeological or historical re-
sources.143 However, the secondary effects of new energy produc-
134. Coastal zone management laws provide an example of that approach. See, e.g., 
CAL. PUB. REs. CoDE§§ 30000-31406 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 
7001-7013 (1975 & Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.213.10 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to -128 
(1978 & Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 46-23-1 to -17 (1980 & Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 90.58.010-.930 (1979 & Supp. 1980). 
135. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6551 (Supp. 1980). 
136. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 9-19-102(a)(ii) (1977). 
137. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1409(b), (f) (1976 & Supp. 1979). 
138. See id; notes 174-194 infra and accompanying text. 
139. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 9-19-102(a)(ii) (1977). 
140. The state government's power to regulate public utilities is well established. See 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Recently, states have authorized utility commissions to 
consider the precise siting of energy generating facilities as part of the licensing process. 
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-276 to -276.18 (1979); CAL. PUB. RES. CoDE §§ 25500-25542 
(West 1977 & Supp. 1980); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 476A.1-.14 (West Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 164, §§ 69G-69S (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 
140-149 (McKinney Supp. 1980); WASH. REv. CoDE§§ 80.50.010-.902 (1979). 
141. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 142 (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
142. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25520(g) (West 1977). 
143. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAw § 146(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981). The California stat-
ute goes even further by specifying that "areas for • • . historic preservation" are not to be 
approved as a power plant site unless "such use is not inconsistent with the primary uses of 
such lands and ... there will be no substantial adverse environmental effects." CAL. Pus. 
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tion will not be determined and are possibly unascertainable at the 
licensing stage. Regulatory and nonregulatory protections men-
tioned elsewhere in this article are therefore necessary to ensure 
that remote effects of energy generation will not damage archeo-
logical properties. 
A second area of state regulation of private enterprises affect-
ing archeological properties is surface or strip mining. Many states 
have enacted legislation regulating surface mining within their bor-
ders.144 Those statutes were spurred by passage of the federal Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977/411 which re-
quires states to have a federally approved surface· mining 
regulatory program.146 The federal law, serving as a model for the 
states, prohibits surface mining on public parks and "places in-
cluded on, or eligible for listing on, the National Register of His-
toric Places unless approved jointly by the [state mining] regula-
tory authority and the Federal, State or local agency with 
jurisdiction over the park or [historic] places."147 An area of land 
also may be designated as unsuitable for surface mining if the op-
erations would "affect fragile or historic lands in which the opera-
tions could result in significant damage to important historic, cul-
tural, scientific, or aesthetic values or natural systems. "148 Several 
states have chosen to closely follow the federal law and regulations 
by empowering state surface mining agencies to designate cultur81 
resource properties as unsuitable for mining activities.149 Others 
REs. ConE § 25527 (West 1977). The statutory section concludes by adding that "the com-
mission shall give the greater consideration to the need for protecting areas of critical envi-
ronmental concern, including •.. unique historical, archeological, and cultural sites." Id. 
144. See, e.g., Miss. ConE ANN. § 53-7-49 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MoNT. REv. ConES ANN. 
§§ 82-4-201 to -254 (1979); N.D. CENT. ConE§ 38-14.1-07 (Supp. 1980); W.VA. ConE§ 20-6-
22 (Supp. 1980); WYo. STAT. § 35-11-406 (1977). 
145. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 3, 1977, 
Pus. L. No. 95-87, titles I-IX, 91 Stat. 447-531). 
146. See id. §§ 1251-1279. The Department of Interior issued final regulations in 1979 
specifying the prerequisites for an approvable program. 30 C.F.R. §§ 700.1-890.23 (1980). 
Those regulations respond to archeological resource interests in a number of ways. See id. § 
776.12(a)(3)(i) (1980) (mining application requires ·a narrative description of listed or eligi-
ble properties of the National Register and known archeological resources); id. § 779.24(i) 
(permit application requires maps of cultural resource locations); id. § 761.12(f) (transmis-
sion of permit application to cultural resource protection agencies for revi~w); id. § 810.2(h) 
(permanent program performance standards). 
147. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979). See also 30 C.F.R. § 761.11(c) (1980). 
148. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1979). See also 30 C.F.R. § 762.11(b)(2) 
(1980). 
149. Compare W.VA. ConE§ 20-6-22(a)(2) (Supp. 1980) and Miss. ConE ANN.§§ 53-
7-49(1)(a), (e) (Cum. Supp. 1979) with 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1979) and 30 
C.F.R. § 762.11(b)(2) (1980). 
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have established legislative criteria for denying surface mining per-
mits, specifically recognizing the value of archeological and histori-
cal sites.1110 Through those regulatory provisions and other sections 
of state mining law,m archeological properties can be spared the 
devastating and disturbing effects of surface mining.m 
4. Local Planning and Land Use Control Authority-Some 
states have granted local governments specific regulatory power to 
protect and preserve historically significant areas.1113 That author-
ity frequently has been used to enact local landmark and historic 
district legislation. 
In addition, state legislatures have often required localities to 
plan community development. In a number of jurisdictions, that 
planning includes requirements that local land use planners con-
sider historical properties in preparation of master or comprehen-
sive plans.m The integration of cultural resource policy into land 
150. See Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 53-7-41(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.§ 
82-4-228(2)(b)(ii) (1979); N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 38-14.1-07(1) (Supp. 1980); W.VA. CoDE§ 20-
6-22(d)(2) (Supp. 1980); WYo. STAT. § 35-ll-406(h)(iv) (1977). 
151. Some states have gone beyond the minimum required by the Department of Inte-
rior regulations. For instance, Mississippi generally prohibits any surface mining 
on lands which are part of a national park, national monument, national historic 
landmark, any property listed on the national register of historic places, national for-
est, national wilderness area, national wildlife refuge, national wild or scenic river, 
state park, state wildlife refuge, state forest, recorded state historic landmark, state 
historic site, state archeological landmark or city or county park, forest or historical 
area. 
MISS. CoDE ANN. § 53-7-47 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Montana, on the other hand, recognizes a 
policy "to restore, enhance, and preserve its scenic, historic, archeological, scientific, cultural 
and recreational sites" within its surface mining law. MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 82-4-
202(1)(d) (1979). The Montana statute also specifically notes that in granting permits for 
prospecting, underground mining and strip mining, "particular attention should be paid to 
the inadequate preservation previously accorded Plains Indian history and culture." Id. § 
82-4-227(2)(d). 
152. The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act against wide-ranging constitutional attacks. See Hodel v. Indiana, 101 
S. Ct. 2376 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 
(1981). 
153. The Texas zoning statute includes "protection and preservation of places and 
areas of historic and cultural importance and significance" in its statement of permissible 
zoning purposes. TEx. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 1011a (1953). Other states have delegated similar 
regulatory power to general and special purpose governmental units. See HAWAII REv. STAT. 
§ 6E-15 (1976) (political subdivisions); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 66D, § 8-101 (1978) (special park 
district); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 (McKinney 1973) (village law). 
154. The New Jersey planning statute provides a useful example. It establishes 
mandatory elements of a local master plan, including "[a] community facilities plan element 
showing the location and type of educational or cultural facilities, historic sites . . . and 
other related facilities, including their relation to the surrounding areas." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
40:55D-28(b)(6) (West Supp. 1981). The term "historic site" is defined in the statute. See 
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use planning systems could avoid archeological site damage caused 
by local government construction and development activities.11515 
Moreover, if local planners identified important sites within their 
jurisdictions, local governmental units could acquire the property 
as a means of protecting significant cultural resources.1156 
General land use planning and control powers are commonly 
delegated to local governments through state enabling acts.1157 
Throughout the nation, control of land use type, density and loca-
tion has been effectuated through the exercise of zoning, subdivi-
sion control and building code requirements. Zoning is authorized 
as a police power regulation intended to accomplish generally 
stated public purposes.1158 Over time, the police power has been 
found to be a legitimate source of authority for an expanding range 
of local land use regulation.1159 The generality of language em-
ployed in the state enabling acts makes it conceivable that local 
governments could create regulations based on the police power to 
preserve archeologically significant sites.160 
As a general principle, highly restrictive local land use controls 
have been judicially approved where they have been shown to be 
• 
rationally related to valid public purposes and not arbitrary or un-
id. § 40:55D-4. The Hawaii statute grants even broader planning and regulatory power to 
local governments. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976). 
155. Some states have granted regional agencies the power to review local develop-
ment projects. It might be advisable to subject such actions to regional review to assess their 
impact on cultural resources. A Kentucky statute, originally enacted in 1961, could serve as 
a model. See Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 147.610, .650 (Baldwin 1980). 
156. See notes 174-194 infra and accompanying text. 
157. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§§ 2.19-.29 (2d ed. 1976). 
158. For an expansive discussion of the major goals of land use planning and zoning, 
see 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§§ 8.01-15.07 (1974). 
159. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (open space protection); Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (historic landmark preserva-
tion); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (shoreline protection 
regulations). See also Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New 
General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REv. 603, 608-38 
(1981). 
160. The Hawaii statute grants expansive authority to local governments: 
In addition to any power or authority of a political subdivison to regwate by planning 
or zoning laws and regulations or by local laws and regulations, the governing body of 
any political subdivision may provide by regulations, special conditions, or restric-
tions for the protection, enhancement, preservation, and use of historic properties. 
Such regulations, special conditions, and restrictions may include appropriate and 
reasonable control of the use of [sic] appearance of adjacent or associate private prop-
erty within the public view, or both, historic easements, preventing deterioration by 
wilful neglect, permitting the modification of local health and building code provi-
sions and transferring development rights. 
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976). 
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reasonable.161 Local zoning ordinances and subdivision controls 
could be designed so that private construction would not be per-
mitted on lands where archeological sites are located.162 In areas 
having many such sites, a land survey might be required as a pre-
requisite to the issuance of a building permit.163 Further, local or-
dinances in jurisdictions with state cultural resource agencies could 
provide that development projects in areas of known archeological 
importance be preceded by a referral to the state body for re-
view.16' Within a reasonable period of time, the agency could take 
actions ranging from a literature or site survey to actual salvage of 
artifacts. In addition, lands found to possess special archeological 
value could be recommended for public acquisition through 
purchase or condemnation. Referral to a state agency would ac-
complish a number of objectives. First, development occurring on 
private lands would be subject to an archeological resource impact 
review. That requirement would provide one of the few methods 
available for regulating development and controlling damaging ac-
tivities on private land. Second, the issue of archeological resource 
protection would necessarily become one of local concern; local 
government officials could no longer ignore cultural resources. 
Third, cooperation between state cultural resource agencies and lo-
cal units of government would be encouraged. By establishing that 
type of coordinated system, many of the protections provided by 
NHP A and state review statutes would be available.1611 
Local governments could also exercise their zoning authority 
to place archeological properties in special zoning classifications 
that limited the land's use. Land use controls restricting a land-
owner's right to develop his property have been upheld as valid 
police power regulations where they sought to achieve important 
social objectives. Examples can be found in controls protecting 
161. See Euclid v .. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
162. For over 50 years, many types of subdivision controls have been imposed on resi-
dential developers. See 5 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 158, §§ 165.01-.09. The subdivision pro-
cess has been regulated for a number of purposes, including the control of large scale devro 1-
opment to minimize adverse financial and environmental effects. Subdivision control 
ordinances often regulate very specific aspects of residential development. See generally D. 
HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 604-10 (2d ed. 
1980). 
163. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 157, § 17.02 (2d ed. 1977); 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra 
note 158, § 16.06 (1975). 
164. Such a system of referral has been applied to state and local government actions. 
See notes 115-125 supra and accompanying text. 
165. See notes 59-68, 115-125 supra and accompanying text. 
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wetlands, 166 shorelines, 167 open spaces, 168 :floodplains169 and histori-
cal properties.17° Frequently, those limitations have required that 
t~e land remain relatively undeveloped.171 If by statute or judicial 
ruling archeological protection was determined to be a legitimate 
exercise of the police power, protective zoning regulations could 
survive initial constitutional due process challenges.172 
166. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Environmental Protection, 168 
Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); Sands 
Point Harbor v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346 A.2d 612 (1975); J.M. Mills v. Murphy, 
116 R.I. 154, 352 A.2d 661 (1976). The most notable case in the area is Just v. Marinette 
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court vali-
dated a highly restrictive county ordinance. 
167. See generally, 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 157, § 2.09 (2d ed. 1976 & Supp. 1980). 
168. The United States Supreme Court recently upheld a California municipality's 
open space regulations against the claim of an uncompensated taking of property. See Agins 
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980). Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated: 
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance legitimate governmental 
goals. The State of California has determined that the development of local open 
space plans will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space 
lands to urban uses." ... The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the 
city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill-effects of urbaniza-
tion. Such governmental purposes have long been recognized as legitimate. 
Id. at 261 (citation omitted). However, the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Fred F. 
French Investing Co. v. New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal 
dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), took a less sympathetic view of local government regulations 
attempting to provide public open space. 
169. See A.H. Smith Sand & Gravel Co. v. Department of Water Resources, 270 Md. 
652, 313 A.2d 820 (1974); Turnpike Realty Co., Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 
N.E.2d 891 (1972); Cappture Realty Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 133 N.J. Super. 216, 336 
A.2d 30 (1975). See also Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the 
Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REv. 201 (1974). 
170. The primary United States Supreme Court opinion upholding restrictive land use 
control regulation for the preservation of historical landmarks is Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). That decision upheld the New York City Landmark 
Preservation Law against constitutional attacks. See note 1 supra. There have been a num-
ber of state and federal court opinions sustaining such ordinances. See, e.g., City of New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976); Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 
416, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1973); Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 
163 (1976); M & N Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 111 ill. App. 2d 444, 250 N.E.2d 
289 (1969); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 111 ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969); 
Vieux Carre Property Owners & Assocs., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 246 La. 788, 167 So. 2d 
367 (1964); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of New 
Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 
198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941); Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 
316 A.2d 807 (1974); State v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); City of Dallas v. 
Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
171. The case of Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), pro-
vides a vivid example of the scope of the police power. In Just, permitted uses under the 
shoreland zoning ordinance were extremely limited. 201 N.W.2d at 765-66 nn.3 & 4. 
172. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 157, § 7.03; D. GoDSCHALK, D. BRoWER, L. 
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A more serious obstacle to archeological site zoning is the pos-
sibility that it would be deemed a "taking" without just compensa-
tion.173 It is assumed that, as in floodplain zoning, a landowner who 
has an archeological site located on his property would be prohib-
ited from taking any action that would disturb the physical integ-
rity of the site. That classification, if permanent, would effectively 
eliminate the development potential of the land. It is not incon-
ceivable that a landowner would regard that form of public regula-
tion as the equivalent of a public acquisition of private land with-
out compensation. 
Although courts have been reluctant to find that public land 
use regulations constitute an impermissible taking of property, 
archeological site zoning would be more appropriate as a tempo-
rary "holding device" used to maintain the status quo until the site 
had been either professionally surveyed or permanently protected 
through governmental or public interest group acquisition. Using 
archeological site zoning as a temporary device would avoid a con-
stitutional attack and provide protection for significant archeologi-
cal sites. 
E. Public Acquisition of Archeological Resources 
While the regulation of land-disturbing activities may present 
an attractive approach to the problem of archeological resource 
damage, acquisition methods are also available. Those techniques 
often provide benefits unattainable through purely regulatory 
methods. First, acquisition of an archeological site by a state or 
local government unit or by a nonprofit organization may perma-
nently remove the land from private market development and in-
crease the total amount of land available to the public for educa-
tional and recreational activities. Second, acquisition would extend 
existing legal protections against unauthorized excavations of land 
McBENNE'IT & B. VESTAL, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 43-44 (1979); 
Note, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1443-62, 1502 (1978). A 
recent Third Circuit opinion addressed the due process issue in the context of restrictive 
rezoning. See Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 689-90 (3d Cir. 1980). 
173. The essence of the landowner's claim would be that the archeological use classifi-
cation constituted an excessive regulation of property rights. As Justice Holmes stated in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922), "[I]f a regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking." The Court's recent refusal to find a taking in the Penn 
Central decision was based on the assumption that the landowner could continue an ex-
isting, profitable use of the land. In the archeological context, the preexisting land use might 
be as undeveloped rural land and, consequently, the analogy to the Penn Central case would 
be imperfect. 
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previously beyond the scope of protection provided by state and 
federallaw.174 And third, by employing a policy of land acquisition, 
potentially significant sites could be reserved for future examina-
tion when new techniques and methods of analysis became availa-
ble.1711 However, it is worth noting that the public acquisition of 
archeological sites, standing alone, does not ensure their preserva-
tion. A commitment to the management and surveillance of those 
areas is necessary to protect against looting and vandalism.176 That 
obligation is a continuing one and must be considered as an impor-
tant land management function by the entity acquiring the land. 
To understand the different options available for acquiring 
property, a number of techniques must be examined. 
1. Acquisition by Purchase-State and local governments 
and public interest groups can protect archeological sites by ob-
taining ownership of parcels through direct purchase from the fee 
title holders.177 Other interests, such as preservation restrictions, 
could also be purchased.178 Because, in the direct purchase context, 
174. See notes 112-114 supra and accompanying text. 
175. New methods of analysis and analytical approaches that will require undisturbed 
locations for their application are being developed. A policy that encourages the salvage of 
sites rather than their preservation would preclude future examinations that could reveal 
important insights into prior societies. See King & Lyneis, Preservation: A Developing Fo-
cus of American Archeology, 80 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 873, 882 (1978). 
176. Vast tracts of land are owned by the federal government and are under the super-
vision of federal officials who are armed with significant enforcement powers. See note 86 
supra and accompanying text. Yet, the expanse of territory to be covered and the small 
number of personnel may make the sanctions provided by federal law less effective than 
they could be. 
177. Where archeological sites are already owned by the government, the "reserva-
tion" power can be used to maintain state or local government control. A number of state 
statutes specifically provide that public lands possessing archeological or historical value 
will not be sold. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-805 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133c2 
(Smith-Hurd 1967); MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 299.52 (Supp. 1981); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. 
§ 2-3-404 (1979); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 55-03-06 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.11 (Pur-
don Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-45.1-8 to -9 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAws .ANN. §§ 1-
20-27, -28 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-6-108 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 765, 766 
(1978). The reservation technique has been incorporated within federal law for nearly a cen-
tury. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. 
178. The acquisition of preservation rights or easements rather than fee title interests 
provides a potentially less expensive method of protecting archeologically significant proper-
ties. In addition, the holding of such an easement does not impose substantial land manage-
ment responsibilities on the owner. The South Dakota statute provides an example of spe~ 
cific legislation authorizing local governments to acquire, by a variety of means, "historic 
easements." The statute provides: 
Any county or municipality may acquire, by purchase, donation or condemnation, 
historic easements in any area within their respective jurisdictions wherever and to 
the extent that the governing body of the county or municipality determines that the 
acquisition will be in the public interest. For the purpose of this section, "historic 
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the seller must be willing to convey title, and the buyer must be 
able to pay seller's price, voluntary land transactions can present 
at least two problems. First, the landowner may not be willing to 
sell because he wants to maintain the existing use or hold the 
property for later sale at an enhanced price. Second, the landowner 
may demand a price the purchaser cannot meet. 
A number of states have specifically authorized governmental 
units to acquire properties having historical and archeological sig-
nificance.179 That statutory authorization is often necessary to pro-
vide an identifiable delegation of power from the state legislature. 
Occasionally, statutory authority for the acquisition of land for 
general conservation purposes, such as open space preservation, 
also permits the purchase of culturally significant sites.180 Even if 
the requisite legislative authority exists for acquiring archeological 
properties, most states do not make funding available.181 Public in-
terest organizations that intend to acquire and preserve such sites 
have similar funding problems because their resources, usually 
donated by members or benefactors, are quite limited.182 
easement" means any easement, restriction, covenant or condition running with the 
land, designated to preserve, maintain or enhance all or part of the existing state of 
places of historical, architectural, archaeological or cultural significance. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-16 (1980). See also notes 185-192 infra and accompanying 
text. 
179. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.09 (West 
1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-25.33 (West 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-9(b) (1981); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5005(a), (c) (Purdon Supp. 1981); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19B-
12 to -16 (1980); VA. CODE§§ 10-152, -156(c)(3) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE§ 79.08.250 (1979); 
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.34(3), (3m) (West Supp. 1981); WYo. STAT. § 18-10-105 (1977). 
180. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 10-152, 156(c)(3) (1978). Local governments may acquire 
funding for the acquisition of cultural resource land under federal open space land legisla-
tion, see 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) (1976), which is administered by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD). That program can provide a grant of up to 50% of the 
acquisition costs. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 540.1(b), .2(f)(3), .3(a), .4(b)(4) (1980). The administra-
tive regulations also anticipate the acquisition of protective easements and other less-than-
fee interests. Id. § 540.6. Complex selection criteria are also provided in the form of HUD 
regulations. I d. §§ 541.1-.20. Note, however, that during fiscal year 1981, the federal acquisi-
tion program was not funded. 
181. Some states have established funds to acquire property interests in cultural 
properties. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 253.4000-.407 (Supp. 1981) (Historic Preservation Revolv-
ing Fund Act); N.Y. PARKS & REc. LAW§§ 17.01-.11 (McKinney 1979) (Outdoor Recreation 
Development Bond Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5001 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (Open Space 
Lands Act). 
182. Although the problem of obtaining sufficient acquisition funds is of major con-
cern, there are some public and private preservation groups that have combined financial 
resources to purchase archeological sites. The Archeological Conservancy, a private organi-
zation, and the Ohio Historical Society, a quasi-public group, have recently joined forces to 
acquire the 120-acre site of the Hopewell Mound Group near Chillicothe, Ohio. That acqui-
sition was intended to protect a major ceremonial site from the threat of urban sprawl. See 
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2. Acquisition by Condemnation-For a number of reasons, 
such as an inadequate offering price or development expectations, 
the present titleholder of an archeological site may not wish to sell. 
Consequently, eminent domain powers may be used as an alterna-
tive means of acquiring the land.183 A number of states have 
granted specific power to state agencies and subordinate govern-
mental units to condemn culturally significant properties.184 It is 
likely that delegations of general condemnation authority also 
could be used to support public "takings" of archeological sites. 
Although authority for the condemnation of archeological sites 
is available, 185 there are a number of considerations that make 
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 19, 1980, at 6B, cols. 5-6. 
183. Condemnation of land or interests in land for the purpose of protecting cultural 
resources has long qualified as a permissible exercise of eminent domain powers. The United 
States Supreme Court has twice ruled that such a condemnation of private property consti-
tutes a valid public purpose within the traditional constitutional bounds of eminent domain. 
See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. See also 2A J.S. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 7.519 (3d ed. 1980). State courts have reached the same result. See Flac-
comio v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 194 Md. 275, 71 A.2d 12 (1950); In re Applica-
tion of Dept. of Archives & History, 246 N.C. 392, 98 S.E.2d 487 (1957). 
184. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060(b) (1977) (state agencies acquiring historical, 
prehistoric or archeological properties in danger); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-3(2) (1976) (state 
agency acquiring historical cultural properties); MINN. STAT. § 138.09 (1980) (counties ac-
quiring archeological sites); NEB. REV. STAT. § 82-120 (1976) (state historical society to ac-
quire historical properties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-25.53 (West 1967) (municipalities ac-
quiring historical sites); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121.9(b), (g) (1981) (state agency acquiring 
properties of historical, architectural, archeological or other cultural importance); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5005(a), (c), 5008 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (state agency and counties acquiring 
historical sites); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.§ 1-19B-16 (1980) (county or municipality acquir-
ing historical easements); VA. CoDE § 10-145.1 (1978) (state attorney general); Wis. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 61.34(3), (3m) (West Supp. 1981) (village acquiring historical places). 
At least one state, Mississippi, has specifically denied counties and municipalities the 
power to use condemnation authority to acquire "historic preservation properties." Miss. 
CoDE ANN. § 39-13-9 (Cum. Supp. 1980). A recent review of Mississippi law concluded that 
the "[d]enial of the eminent domain power would be a serious hindrance to the preservative 
cause but for an earlier statutory provision authorizing county boards of supervisors to ac-
quire historic sites by gift or grant." Comment, Historic Preservation and the Zoning 
Power: A Mississippi Perspective, 50 Miss. L.J. 533, 561 (1979). The author apparently did 
not consider the possibility of an unwilling grantor. The Virginia state courts have narrowly 
construed the eminent domain power to make it exercisable only by the state attorney gen-
eral. See Virginia Historic Landmarks Comm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 568, 230 
S.E.2d 449 (1976). 
185. The Alaska statute anticipates one situation where the exercise of condemnation 
authority may be crucial. If the Alaska Department of Natural Resources finds that an his-
torical, prehistoric or archeological property is in danger of being sold or used so that its 
cultural value will be destroyed or seriously impaired, the state agency may acquire the 
property by eminent domain. See ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060(b) (1977). That provision for 
emergency use of the condemnation power is valuable, although its usefulness would depend 
on prompt notification of impending site damage. 
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other acquisition methods preferable in most circumstances. First, 
taking of property by eminent domain requires compliance with a 
detailed condemnation procedure, which is often the subject of ju-
dicial review. Local government officials may not wish to risk the 
financial and political cost of an extended struggle for acquisition 
of property for cultural resource preservation. Second, the con-
demnor must compensate the landowner for the property rights 
that are taken. That presents the same problem encountered in the 
voluntary acquisition context-a lack of funding. Third, a local 
government could face political opposition to a decision for either 
the expenditure of public funds or the exercise of eminent domain 
power in acquiring and protecting archeological sites. Fourth, the 
acquisition of an archeological site by condemnation would require 
a continuing management responsibility, which a local governmen-
tal unit might not wish to assume. Fifth, local governments' sepa-
rate purchases or condemnations could result in the misallocation 
of scarce acquisition funds. Finally, such a decentralized system 
would not ensure that the most significant archeological sites, de-
termined on the basis of state or regional priority, would be 
acquired. 
3. Protective Restrictions-Because the acquisition of fee in-
terests in lands possessing special environmental or cultural value 
may be impractical, a large number of state legislatures have pro-
vided for restrictive land use agreements, which can be useful in 
protecting those valuable interests.186 Protective restrictions per-
186. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206 (Supp. 1979) (perservation restriction); 
CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -110 (Supp. 1978) (conservation easement); CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 47-42a to -42c (1978) (conservation restriction); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06 (West 
1981) (conservation easement); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 85-1406 to -1410 (1978 & Supp. 1980) 
(conservation easement); HAWAn REv. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976) (historic easements); IDAHO 
CooE § 67-4613 (1980) (historic easements); !LL. ANN. STAT. cb. 24, §§ 11-48.2-1A(2), (5) 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); id. ch. 30, §§ 401-406 (conservation rights); IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 
14-4-5.5-1 to -4 (Burns 1981) (conservation easement); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1252 (West 
Supp. 1980) (preservation restriction); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 66B, § 8.04 (1978) (architectural 
easements); Mo. REAL PRoP. CoDE ANN. § 2-118 (1974 & Supp. 1980) (conservation ease-
ment);' MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981) (conservation, 
preservation and agricultural restrictions); MicH. CoMP, LAWS ANN. § 554.706 (Supp. 1981) 
(open space easement); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 67.870-.955 (1978) (open space); MoNT. REv. 
CODES ANN. §§ 76-6-101 to -211 (1976) (conservation easements); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 
77:45-:47 (Supp. 1979) (conservation and preservation restriction); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8B-
1 to B-9 (West Supp. 1981) (conservation and historic preservation restriction); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 121-34 to -43 (1981) (conservation and historic preservation agreements); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 271.710-.750 (1979) (conservation or scenic easements); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 
11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (open space covenants); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5 
(Supp. 1980) (conservation and preservation restrictions); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-
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mit landowners to transfer specifically defined development rights 
to their land. By conveying away a preservation restriction, the 
present landowner agrees to subject his property to limitations 
that can preserve an existing use, in theory protecting the cultural 
resource located on the land. Protective restrictions are similar to 
the traditional restrictive covenant or equitable servitude.187 To 
avoid technical limitations inherent in the traditional real property 
devices, state legislation authorizing protective agreements often 
specifies that the restrictions are binding against successive owners 
of the land and are enforceable by transferees of the initial 
grantee.188 
Some landowners may willingly transfer protective easements 
without any additional incentive other than the thought that the 
present condition of their lands will be preserved. However, eco-
nomic incentives exist to further encourage the donation of restric-
tive covenants to public bodies or nonprofit organizations. Making 
a gift of a preservation right to such entities can qualify as a tax 
deductible charitable contribution for federal income tax pur-
poses.189 The Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1977 to rec-
ognize charitable gifts of real property easements "granted in 
19B-16 (1980) (historic easements); TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 64-9-101 to -103 (Supp. 1980) 
(preservation easement); id. §§ 11-15-101 to -108 (1980) (protective easements); UTAH CoDE 
ANN. §§ 63-lSa-1 to -6 (1978) (preservation easement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 10-821 to -
823 (Supp. 1980) (conservation and preservation rights and interests); VA. CoDE § 10-142 
(1978) (restrictions); WAsH. REv. CoDE§ 64.04.130 (1979) (preservation easements); W.VA. 
CoDE § 8-26A-4 (1976) (historic restriction). 
187. See generally A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TExT ON PROPERTY 1024-78 (2d 
ed. 1969). 
188. The Rhode Island statute concerning "conservation restrictions" specifically ad-
dresses those issues: 
No conservation restriction held by any governmental body or by a charitable 
corporation, association, trust or other entity whose purposes include conservation of 
land or water areas or of a particular such area, and no preservation restriction held 
by any governmental body or by a charitable corporation, association, trust or other 
entity whose purposes include preservation of structures or sites of historical signifi-
cance or of a particular such structure or site, shall be [unenforceable] against any 
owner of the restricted land or structure on account of lack of privity of estate or 
contract, or lack of benefit to particular land, or on account of the benefit being 
assignable or being assigned to any other governmental body or to any entity with 
like purposes, or on account of any other doctrine of property law which might 
cause the termination of such a restriction. 
R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-39-3 (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). 
189. The federal income tax laws have provided significant economic incentives in the 
form of rapid amortization and accelerated depreciation to aid in the preservation of his-
toric buildings. See NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, TAX INCENTIVES FOR HIS-
TORIC PRESERVATION 7-54 (G. Andrews ed. 1980); Day, Federal Income Tax Reform: An Im-
portant Tool for Historic Preservation, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 315, 329-36 (1980). 
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perpetuity . . . exclusively for conservation purposes. mso The eco-
nomic importance of that federal income tax provision depends on 
the value assigned to the donated easement: the greater the restric-
tion, the larger the charitable contribution.191 In the context of 
archeological properties, the precise valuation of the transferred 
restriction· will be determined by the value of alternative land uses 
that are no longer permissible. That allows a larger deduction 
where the donated preservation restriction eliminates use of the 
land for more lucrative activities. 
In addition to the federal income tax deduction for donation 
of a preservation restriction, state laws frequently offer the induce-
ment of reduced real estate taxes.192 On the theory that the owner 
of the fee simple estate has conveyed away part of his interest in 
the land, state statutes direct that the remaining restricted prop-
erty be taxed at a reduced value. That lower appraisal is derived 
from an estimate of fair market value of the land encumbered by 
the preservation restriction. By transferring the preservation re-
striction to a governmental entity or nonprofit organization, the 
landowner is taxed for the limited use permitted rather than the 
highest and best use of the land.193 The real estate tax reduction 
190. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii). 
191. The Internal Revenue Code generally limits the maximum amount of charitable 
contribution deductions to 50% of the taxpayer's "contribution base for the taxable year." 
Id. § 170(b). The deduction of an extremely large contribution can be carried forward up to 
five years. Id. § 170(d). 
192. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 29.53.025(b)(2)(C), (e) (Supp. 1980) (possible total exemp-
tion of burdened land from real estate taxes); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-139.01-.03 (1980), 
-277(B)(8) (Supp. 1981) (possible 15-year valuation at eight percent of full cash value to 
owners of land with recognized historical value); CAL. REv. & TAX ConE§§ 421-430.5 (West 
1970 & Supp. 1981) (valuation of restricted open space); id. §§ 439-439.4 (West Supp. 1981) 
(valuation of restricted historical property); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 39-1-104(5) (Supp. 1980) 
(state historical register status will not add to valuation); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-131b, 12-
127a (1972) (open space land valuation and possible municipal tax abatement for historical 
structures); GA. ConE ANN. §§ 85-1407, -1409 (1978 & Supp. 1980) (valuation of land encum-
bered by facade or conservation easements); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-6 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1981) (valuation reduced by restrictions); Mn. ANN. ConE art. 81, § 12E (1980) (tax 
credit for open space lands); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 361A.050, .170-.250 (1979) (open space use 
assessments); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-40 (1981) (land encumbered by conservation and pres-
ervation agreement assessed at encumbered value); Omo REv. ConE ANN. § 5709.18 (Page 
1980) (total value tax exemption for prehistoric sites); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 308.740-.790 (1979) 
(open space land assessment); TENN. ConE ANN. § 11-15-105 (1980) (assessment at encum-
bered value of land subject to scenic easements); VA. ConE § 10-155 (1978) (assessments of 
land subject to restrictions); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. §§ 84.34.010-.922 (Supp. 1980) (current 
use assessment). 
193. The ability to reduce local land taxes by the donation of preservation restrictions 
to tax exempt organizations or the state government provides the landowner an economic 
benefit, but it may be unattractive to the local taxing jurisdiction, which would lose tax 
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derived from that approach could be substantial, resulting in the 
continuation of existing land uses that did not disturb cultural re-
source sites. 
If considered in combination with the associated economic in-
centives, preservation restrictions are powerful tools for protecting 
culturally important lands. However, in the context of archeologi-
cally significant properties, preservation restrictions must be care-
fully drafted to clarify the range of permissible activities allowed 
the landowner. Also, the holders of those restrictions must consci-
entiously inspect the burdened parcels at regular intervals to en-
sure that the agreements have not been breached. Because the idea 
of specialized nonpossessory land use restrictions has spread rap-
idly throughout the nation, it is likely that they will provide an 
inexpensive, nonregulatory method for protecting socially signifi-
cant lands.194 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Most states have recognized the existence of archeological re-
sources by statute and have attempted to protect them through 
regulatory and nonregulatory policies. However, it is unusual to 
find a comprehensive and integrated approach in any single juris-
diction. Although several methods are available to protect archeo-
logical sites, few states have adopted them all as a unified system. 
Because state and local governments have the potential for signifi-
cant action in the area of archeological resource protection, it is 
suggested that an analysis be undertaken of the sufficiency of local 
law in each state. Such an analysis would require an understanding 
revenues. If the recipient of the restriction was a tax exempt entity, the value of the reduc-
tion embodied by the agreement would escape local taxation because the new owner of the 
interest would be tax exempt. That factor could make local governments and other taxing 
authorities reluctant to have state preservation restriction laws that eroded their tax base. 
194. The expanding state law in this field makes it possible for landowners to donate 
or sell preservation rights in their land and may have a major impact on future protection of 
cultural properties. Public and private entities now will be able to own nonpossessory inter-
ests that can be judicially enforced. For example, Connecticut law specifically states: 
[C]onservation and preservation restrictions are interests in land and may be ac-
quired by any governmental body or any charitable corporation or trust which has 
the power to acquire interests in land in the same manner as it may acquire other 
interests in land. Such restrictions may be enforced by injunction or proceedings in 
equity. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-42 (1981). 
The private landowner will retain possession and existing use of the property, but will 
have ceded the right to modify the land use to one that could damage or destroy the pro-
tected interest. 
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of the essential components of a comprehensive state program for 
the protection of archeological sites. 
1. States should have a cultural resource agency that is 
staffed by fully trained individuals and is adequately funded. The 
state cultural resource .agency could be charged with a wide range 
of responsibilities, including the discovery and identification of 
archeologically important sites, intergovernmental review and com-
ment on state agency actions, expeditious acquisition of title or 
preservation rights to immediately imperiled sites, active solicita-
tion of donations of culturally significant properties, provisions for 
expert advice and technical assistance to local governments, and 
education of the general public to the value of cultural resources. 
Counties or regional organizations could be integrated into state-
wide systems to locate, acquire and preserve archeological sites. 
2. State legislatures should express a clear policy favoring 
the preservation of archeological resources located on private as 
well as public land. Those policy statements should be applicable 
to all governmental action and should affirm the principle that in-
tentional or accidental site damage must be avoided. Significant 
cultural sites should be presumptively ineligible for public con-
struction projects, and destructive use of those sites should be lim-
ited to extraordinary situations where no reasonable or prudent al-
ternative exists. The legislative policy statements also should 
require compliance by state and local government agencies and 
those requirements should be enforceable in suits by private 
citizens. 
3. A system of intergovernmental review should be estab-
lished to evaluate the effect of state agencies' development pro-
posals on cultural resources. Many development projects are 
funded, licensed or otherwise assisted by the federal government 
and consequently come under the review provisions of NEPA and 
the NHP A. However, a large number of other potentially damaging 
activities are undertaken solely by subfederal governmental units 
and therefore escape the coverage of federal law. State activities 
should be evaulated by an independent commission or cultural re-
source agency, which could advise the project agency of possible 
adverse effects on archeological sites and suggest ways of mitigat-
ing the impact. To avoid lengthy delays, the review procedure 
should be limited in duration, and inaction should create a pre-
sumption of approval. In cases of serious and immediate threats to 
extremely significant cultural properties, the review commission 
should be empowered to stop the development agency's project for 
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a period of time to enable it to appeal directly to the governor. In 
addition, public intervention could be employed to allow for the 
submission of written comments, public hearings or citizen suit 
proceedings. Over time, such a review procedure, coupled with a 
legislative policy statement favoring the preservation of archeologi-
cal sites, could alter state agency project planning practices. 
Although state activities may be subject to some form of cul-
tural resource or environmental review, local governments' actions 
are often free of external evaluation. It would be advisable to sub-
ject some of those local activities to review by statewide or regional 
cultural resource organizations. State legislative policy also should 
direct local governments to plan their construction projects to 
avoid, where possible, the use of archeological properties. Known 
or suspected archeological sites might also be exempted from pub-
lic use without special review and analysis. In addition to regulat-
ing their own development activities, local governments should be 
encouraged to protect known or discovered archeological sites by 
direct acquisition or through cooperation with preservation organi-
zations. The enactment of local regulatory ordinances protecting 
those sites would supplement existing state authority. 
State legislatures should appropriate funds for the purchase or 
condemnation of significant sites that are in danger of being dam-
aged by private activities. The acquisition of full fee interests or 
restrictive agreements should be authorized. Cooperative proce-
dures should be established between privately funded preservation 
organizations and state funded cultural resource agencies to ensure 
that limited private funds will be used to protect the most seri-
ously imperiled sites. In an era of severe government budget re-
strictions, that public/private collaboration should include joint ef-
forts aimed at securing additional financial support from · 
charitable foundations and other contributors for archeological site 
acquisition. 
Legislative action could enhance a protective acquisition pol-
icy by encouraging the sale and acquisition of protective restric-
tions or covenants. The formal recognition of those severable rights 
would facilitate private donations of enforceable land restrictions 
without cost to the state or preservation organization. Without a 
clear interpretation of state law establishing the existence and en-
forceability of preservation rights, landowners might be reluctant 
to make such donations. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The federal government has taken two primary approaches to 
the problem of cultural resource protection: acquisition and regula-
tion. The limitations of that structure are apparent. Financial con-
straints allow only limited acquisition of historically or archeologi-
cally significant sites. Furthermore, federal authority to require 
advance expert review of potentially destructive activities extends 
only to actions undertaken by federal agencies, their licensees or 
grantees. In addition, the federal archeological site excavation per-
mit process reaches only federally owned or controlled land. There-
fore, the federal legislative policy standing alone cannot control the 
full range of activities that threaten archeological sites and arti-
facts. A significant role exists for state and local governments to 
assist the federal government in protecting irreplaceable cultural 
resources. 
Ultimately, the question of state action will be determined on 
the basis of the priority accorded cultural resource protection by 
state and local officials and administrators. States can create a pol-
icy favoring cultural resource protection, but such a policy must be 
supported by numerous government officials having only periph-
eral contact with historical and archeological resources. It is of 
prime importance that state and local officers be made aware of 
the significance of archeological sites and artifacts and then foster 
a preservationist philosophy. That direction must inevitably come 
from the legislature and must take the form of specific programs 
and protective legal standards. 
Failure to protect archeological resources in a comprehensive 
fashion will mean that future generations of Americans will lose 
irreplaceable knowledge about prior societies and about their cul-
tural heritage. Unless a clear policy of preserving significant arche-
ological sites is established, the destruction of sites and artifacts by 
public and private land development and by acts of vandalism and 
pillage will persist. We possess the means to avoid that destruction 
through coordinated intergovernmental action. That opportunity 
will not exist forever; to allow it to pass would be unpardonable. 
